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ABSTRACT 
A considerable amount of research has been conducted on the topic of migration and 
remittances over the last few years, but the literature on the South Africa-Zimbabwe remittance 
corridor remains scarce.  Using a survey conducted in April 2010 of 347 Zimbabwean migrants 
living in the Western Cape Province, this paper is focused on three primary aims.  The first is to 
gain an insight into the remittance-sending behaviour and patterns of Zimbabwean migrants in 
South Africa.  The second is to apply the survey data to assess underlying dynamics of the 
drivers that influence migrants’ remittance-sending decisions.  The third is to analyze and discuss 
the constraints to remitting that Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa are faced with and that 
shape the remittance-sending landscape.   
The survey results show that remittance flows in the South Africa-Zimbabwe remittance corridor 
are considerable, with more than 90 per cent of Zimbabwean migrants in the sample remitting 
on average almost a third of their income.  The most significant driver of remittances was found 
to be the number of dependants that migrants have in Zimbabwe.  Moreover, the great majority 
of remittances are sent through informal channels, despite the inefficiency and high costs of 
these.  The paper concludes that there are significant market inefficiencies and impediments in 
South Africa that negatively impact the flow of remittances to Zimbabwe, both by driving up 
costs and by excluding the majority of migrants from formal remittance channels.   
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Less is known about remittances in Africa than in any other developing region of the world.  
Due to a lack of reliable data on migration and remittance flows, research in this field has long 
been confined primarily to pecuniary transfers made through formal channels and recorded in 
the Balance of Payments.  Relying on this method to source data is problematic given that 
unrecorded informal flows actually make up the preponderant share of transfers within Sub-
Saharan Africa.  The only way to begin to understand the underlying dynamics of these informal 
flows and to shed light on their true volume is through primary survey data, of which there is a 
serious shortage.  This paper takes a step towards addressing this gap. 
Using a survey1 conducted in April 2010 of 347 Zimbabwean migrants living in South Africa’s 
Western Cape Province, the paper is focused around three principle objectives.  The first is to 
gain insight into and quantify the remittance-sending behaviour and patterns of the migrants.  
The second is to utilise a regression analysis to assess underlying dynamics of the drivers that 
influence migrants’ remittance-sending decisions.  The third is to analyze the constraints to 
remitting that migrants in South Africa are faced with and that consequently shape the 
remittance-sending landscape.   
Remittances are relied on in Zimbabwe to sustain the livelihoods of large parts of the population.  
It has been estimated that close to three million Zimbabweans have emigrated over the past 
decade, roughly two thirds of these to South Africa.  The survey results suggest that 90 per cent 
of migrants in the sample remitted; the average amount was close to a third of their income2.  
These findings are higher than those from most other remittance corridors in various parts of 
the world, which underscores the depth of the current dependence on remittances in Zimbabwe.   
The most significant driver of remittances was found to be the number of dependants that 
migrants have in Zimbabwe.  The results of a regression analysis show that for every extra 
dependant in Zimbabwe, migrants will on average remit an additional 4-7% of their annual 
income.  The existence of children in South Africa and the duration of time spent in South 
Africa were both negatively correlated with remittances sent, as would be expected.  Other 
factors, such as the cost of remittance transfers, the gender or age of migrants, the years of 
schooling completed or whether migrants are from rural or urban areas were not found to 
significantly impact the share of income that migrants remit.   
Although individual transactions are in most cases small, due to the large stock of Zimbabwean 
migrants in South Africa, total remittance flows from Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa 
alone are estimated to have amounted to between US$700-850 3  million last year.  This 
accentuates not only the importance remittances currently have in supporting livelihoods, but 
also their effect on the Zimbabwean economy, being one of the most important sources of 
foreign currency inflows.  In kind transfers are estimated to make up roughly 40% of this total.  
                                                          
1 This survey was complemented by several focus group discussions and interviews with key stakeholders.   
2 Including both pecuniary (cash) and in kind (‘value of goods’) remittance transfers.  This holistic approach to 
measuring remittances is applied throughout the paper. 
3 Author’s data and calculations.  Overall remittance flows to the country likely to be between US$1-1.4 billion 
annually.   
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However, the survey results indicate that their share is falling; a trend which is the likely result of 
a nascent economic recovery in Zimbabwe.  If a gradual recovery is maintained, flows can be 
expected to continue evolving more and more towards monetary transactions.   
This paper finds that there are significant market inefficiencies and institutional impediments in 
South Africa that negatively impact the flow of remittances to Zimbabwe.  As a direct result of 
the stringent foreign exchange and banking regulations in South Africa, competition in the 
money transfer business is constrained and therefore the average cost of sending money from 
South Africa to Zimbabwe is extremely high at 10-15% of the value remitted.  In more efficient 
remittance corridors, costs are commonly in the 3-5% range.  To make matters worse, legal 
regulations exclude the majority of migrants from accessing formal remittance channels.  It 
comes as no surprise then that over 80 per cent of survey respondents resorted to using only 
informal remittance channels, despite the inefficiency, unreliability and high costs of these.  This 
is having adverse effects on both the nature of remittance flows to Zimbabwe and the volume 
that reaches recipients, thereby denying Zimbabweans of their full development potential.   
Indeed, if the development gains for Zimbabwe are to be maximised then the formalization of 
remittance flows must be fostered through the implementation of a number of key reforms.  Not 
only is it important that the costs are reduced and barriers to formal channels minimized, but 
also that flows are facilitated and stimulated by providing the appropriate channels, financial 
education and effective incentives.  Particularly Money Transfer Operators, if competition is 
increased, and postal services, if reliability is strengthened, seem to offer the greatest potential.  
Moreover, numerous innovative developments such as cell phone banking, already widely used 
in other parts of the world, are gradually starting to be introduced in South Africa.  They are 
likely to be the way of the future and should be encouraged accordingly. 
Perhaps contrary to initial impression, it is in the interest of the South African government to 
facilitate the formalization of remittance flows.  Rather than increasing the volume of flows, the 
effect would make flows more transparent and to increase the liquidity and efficiency of the 
financial sector in South Africa.  Thus, remittances in this corridor represent a huge source of 
untapped potential for development on both sides of the border that is currently being mitigated 
by high transfer costs and impeded by stringent and inefficient regulations.  If the formalization 
of remittance flows is pursued comprehensively, remittances could realise their potential and play 
an invaluable role in the reconstruction of the Zimbabwean economy.  This, in turn, is the only 
way to solve the currently unsustainable level of Zimbabwean migration to South Africa. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Migration is an issue that has been at the heart of the international development field for quite 
some time, but migration-driven remittances have long been underestimated and as a result their 
importance for development was under-appreciated.  However, over the past decade, following 
extensive data collection by the World Bank that substantially raised the estimates of these flows, 
remittances have started receiving serious attention from policy makers and academics alike.  
Migration-driven remittances to developing countries are now considered to be one of the key 
sources of development finance of the 21st century.  Presently, among financial flows to 
developing countries, remittances are estimated to be more than three times the size of official 
development assistance, and almost as large as foreign direct investment (World Bank 2009).  
During the global economic downturn in 2008-2009, remittances declined slightly for the first 
time since data collection began, but much less so that other international capital flows, and thus 
provided many developing countries with a safety net.   
In Zimbabwe, remittances are relied on to ensure the income of large parts of the population.  
As a result of the profound deterioration of the economy and general socio-political situation, it 
has been estimated that close to three million Zimbabweans have emigrated over the past 
decade, about two thirds of these to South Africa (UNDP 2010).  Of those who remained, the 
international community has needed to provide food aid to over five million people in 2008, 
which is more than half of the remaining population.  Against this background it is easy to see 
how vital remittances have been in alleviating poverty in many Zimbabwean households for the 
greater part of the last decade. 
Although there is a large and growing amount of literature on the correlation between 
remittances and various measures of development in many parts of the world, little analysis has 
been done on Sub-Saharan Africa, and even less on the South Africa-Zimbabwe remittance 
corridor.  This is in part due to a lack of reliable data on migration from Zimbabwe to South 
Africa.  More consequential, however, is the fact that the vast majority of transactions are made 
through informal channels, and are thus not officially recorded.  The only way to uncover the 
true size and to begin to understand the real dynamics of these informal flows is through primary 
survey data, of which there is a serious shortage.  This paper takes a step towards addressing this 
gap.   
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The research is based on the findings of a survey conducted in April 2010 of 347 Zimbabwean 
migrants living in the Western Cape Province. This survey was complemented by several focus 
group discussions and interviews with key stakeholders.  Since remittances represent first and 
foremost private money and goods, senders and recipients are the main stakeholders in decisions 
regarding both the transfer and utilization of them.  Therefore, gaining a clearer understanding 
of the senders and recipients’ characteristics, motivations, priorities, needs, difficulties and 
interests regarding the preferred transfer mechanisms and utilization of remittances is crucial in 
the analysis of this remittance corridor.  
The issues surrounding the South Africa-Zimbabwe remittance corridor are multi-faceted and 
diverse, and hence this paper is focused around three principal objectives.  The first is to gain an 
insight into the remittance-sending behaviour and patterns of Zimbabwean migrants in South 
Africa using the survey.  The second is to apply the survey data to assess underlying dynamics 
regarding the drivers that influence migrants’ remittance-sending decisions.  The third objective 
is to analyze and discuss the constraints to remitting that Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa 
are faced with and that shape the remittance-sending landscape.  
The survey results show that remittance flows in the South Africa-Zimbabwe remittance corridor 
are considerable.  More than 90 per cent of migrants in the sample sent remittances to 
Zimbabwe over the past year to support family members.  Including both cash and the value of 
goods remitted, the average share of total income that migrants remitted was over 30 per cent.  
This finding is higher than in most remittance corridors in other parts of the world, and seems to 
highlight the depth of the current dependence on remittances in Zimbabwe.  Although individual 
transactions are in most cases small, due to the large stock of Zimbabwean migrants in South 
Africa, remittance flows in this corridor alone add up to an estimated US$ 680-905 million 
annually4.  When adding the estimated remittance flows from other Zimbabwean migrant hosting 
countries to this, it becomes clear that remittances are currently one of the most important 
sources of foreign currency inflows for Zimbabwe. 
This paper finds that the most significant driver of remittances is the number of dependants that 
migrants have in Zimbabwe.  The results of a regression analysis show that for every additional 
dependant in Zimbabwe, each migrant will remit an additional 4-7% of their annual income, on 
average.  Most other variables for which data was gathered demonstrated only weak statistical
                                                                     
                                                          
4 Author’s data and calculations. It includes both cash transfers and the value of goods transferred. 
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significance.  Although data limitations precluded a more thorough analysis, it is evident that 
migrants’ remittance-sending decisions are complex.  
There are significant market inefficiencies, impediments and constraints in South Africa that 
impact the supply of remittances in the South Africa-Zimbabwe corridor, both by driving up 
costs and by excluding the majority of migrants from the formal remittance channels.  It comes 
as no surprise that almost 85 per cent of survey respondents resorted to using informal 
remittance channels, despite the inefficiency, unreliability and high costs of these channels.  This 
is having adverse effects on both the nature of remittance flows to Zimbabwe and the volume 
that reaches recipients, thereby denying Zimbabweans of their full development potential.   
If the development gains for Zimbabwe are to be maximised, and the burden of immigration 
eased for South Africa, then a number of crucial, yet simple reforms should be implemented.  
Not only is it important that the costs are reduced and barriers to formal channels minimized, 
but also that flows are facilitated and stimulated by providing the appropriate channels, financial 
education and effective incentives.  Providing appropriate incentives and decreasing the 
constraints to formal remittance transactions has been shown elsewhere to lead to significant 
increases of flows (Gibson et al. 2006).  If the formalization of remittance flows is pursued 
comprehensively, remittances may expand their potential and play an invaluable role in the 
reconstruction of the Zimbabwean economy. 
Section II examines several key background issues, including the definition of remittances, the 
different drivers of remittance flows, and what the existing literature says about the economic 
and developmental effects of remittance flows.  Section III reviews several of the main studies 
dealing specifically with the South Africa-Zimbabwe remittance corridor.  Section IV then 
highlights the economic situation in Zimbabwe, as well as the dynamics of Zimbabwean 
migration to South Africa before Section V presents the results of the survey.  Section VI 
discusses these results in the context of assessing the various drivers of remittance flows and 
Section VII highlights the different constraints to these in South Africa.  Section VIII discusses 
the potential gains of minimizing these constraints before Section XI analyses the policy 
implications of these findings.  Section X then draws the main conclusions of the study.  
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II. BACKGROUND ISSUES CONCERNING REMITTANCES 
The World Bank has highlighted the importance of official flows of migrant remittances to 
developing countries, which doubled between 2002 and 2007, and were estimated to have 
reached a record US$336 billion in 20085 (World Bank 2010).   Some 30 million or so African 
migrants contributed about US$40 billion, or 12 per cent, to that total (ibid).  On a global scale, 
the rapid growth of officially recorded remittances in recent years is attributed to an increase in 
migration, better data collection and to the gradual shift from informal to formal transmission 
channels.  This shift seems to be in large degree due to the development of new technologies 
(e.g. cell phone payments), reduced transaction costs and international political concern about 
informal capital flows and money laundering after the terrorist attacks in 2001 (Gubert et al. 
2009).   
Remittance flows globally had a more resilient response to the global financial crisis and 
subsequent recession in 2008-2009 than other financial flows to developing countries.  Private 
financial flows6 to developing countries dropped by nearly 40 per cent in 2008 as many investors 
and foreign banks became more reluctant to invest and lend across borders (The Economist, July 
30th 2009).  In contrast, global remittance flows proved to be far less volatile.  Although official 
remittance flows in 2009 declined for the first time since data collection began, the 6.1 per cent 
decline was smaller than feared (World Bank 2010).  Although job markets in most host 
countries have been tough in the wake of the crisis, only few migrants seem to have returned 
home and hence, remittance flows are expected to recover in 2010-11 (ibid).  However, recovery 
is likely to be shallow due to a likely prolonged lag-effect following the weak global economic 
performance in 2009, in addition to other risks, including a potential ‘jobless’ economic recovery, 
tighter immigration controls imposed by many developed nations and unpredictable exchange 
rate movements (ibid).   
Measurements of official remittance flows compiled according to methods promoted by the IMF 
and the World Bank are valuable, but they may not represent the whole picture7.  The true size of 
remittances remains uncertain owing to two interconnected reasons: (i) the disputed definition of 
remittances and (ii) the underestimation bias from measuring only formal remittance flows and 
failing to capture informal flows.   
                                                          
5 Including just formal flows that are recorded in the Balance of Payments of countries.  The actual magnitude, 
including informal and unrecorded flows, is likely to be 50-60 per cent higher (World Bank 2009).  
6 Refers to flows that are not remittance-related, such as foreign direct investment and credit. 
7 See annex 1 for details. 
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CASH VS. GOODS 
Definitions traditionally confine remittances to cash or financial transfers, which is the method 
adopted by the World Bank and the IMF due largely to the absence of sufficient data.  However, 
as is conceded by these institutions themselves, this narrow method underestimates total 
remittance flows (World Bank 2009) due to the fact that a large share of overall remittance flows 
to developing countries are actually in-kind (van Doorn, 2002).  A more inclusive definition of 
remittances would be “the value of migrant workers’ earnings sent back home to their families” 
(IFAD 2008, p.2), which encompasses both cash and non-cash remittances.  This holistic 
definition is applied in this paper, because it more appropriately represents both the size and 
nature of remittance flows in the South Africa-Zimbabwe corridor.   
In this analysis of the South Africa-Zimbabwe remittance corridor, considering the transfer of 
goods as remittance flows is validated by studies conducted by Maphosa (2007) and Kerzner 
(2009), which find that the majority8 of remittance flows from South Africa to Zimbabwe over 
the past decade have been in the form of goods, such as cooking oil, maize and clothing.  The 
primary reason for this has been the economic implosion in Zimbabwe, particularly the rapid 
decline of the agricultural sector.  During the years of hyperinflation, many goods were either 
unavailable in Zimbabwe, or only available at exorbitant prices.  Hence, non-cash remittances 
better respond to the immediate needs of recipients, especially when there are shortages of 
goods.   
At present, following the moderate political and economic stabilisation, particularly the end of 
hyperinflation and the decision of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe in January 2009 to allow all 
businesses to trade in foreign currencies, the trend has begun reversing back towards increased 
monetary transfers.  Nevertheless, goods sent back still make up a large share of the value of 
what is remitted, because of a second reason; namely that non-cash remittances are preferred 
when there is an absence of banking facilities, which is often the case in rural areas (Maphosa 
2007).  This balance between cash and non-cash remittances is confirmed by the findings of the 
survey and will be discussed in section V below.  Therefore, in-kind remittances should not be 
ignored by the literature, as is often the case. 
 
 
                                                          
8 Maphosa noted that “Most of the remittances sent were in-kind” (p.128), while Kerzner cited a more up-to-date 
figure that close to 50 per cent of migrant remittances are goods. 
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FORMAL VS. INFORMAL FLOWS 
The second measurement issue depends on whether the transfer channel from the sending to the 
recipient country is formal or informal.  If transfers are sent through official channels, such as 
banks or licensed money transfer operators (MTOs), they are considered formal and are 
captured by the Central Bank and included in the Balance of Payments.  Informal transfers refer 
to the use of unofficial channels, such as using friends, relatives or private couriers to transport 
cash and goods into the receiving country without declaration. 
The World Bank estimates that informal flows are at least 50 per cent higher than officially 
recorded flows, with great variation across countries (World Bank 2009).  In Sub-Saharan Africa, 
this number is often higher than 75 per cent (Freund and Spatafora, 2005), because the formal 
sector is far less developed in this region than in other developing countries across the globe.  In 
the South Africa-Zimbabwe corridor studies have shown that close to 90 per cent of remittance 
flows are informal (Maphosa 2007).  The research in this paper supports this finding, as is 
discussed in section V.  
Because informal transfers are not captured in the official statistics such as the Balance of 
Payments, the size of remittances is often grossly underestimated and their nature 
misunderstood.  Informal remittance flows have different dynamics than formal flows, and can 
only be recorded in case studies and primary data collection exercises, as is set out in this paper.  
This is important, because the lack of accurate data on informal and in-kind remittances has long 
precluded more rigorous statistical analysis in this field.   
What exacerbates the problem with the current common practice is that in many cases Balance 
of Payments data are not available, and when they are, they are often compiled using creative 
accounting practices.  In fact, in SADC, not one country records remittances as a separate line 
item in the balance of payments estimates (Genesis 2005), meaning that most figures obtained 
through official databases are approximations calculated using various statistical methods.  More 
specifically, due to the economic and institutional deterioration in Zimbabwe, there exists no 
credible recent data on remittance flows, neither from the Balance of Payments, nor from 
household surveys.  In the World Bank’s database on global remittance flows, Zimbabwe is one 
of the considerable number of Sub-Saharan African countries that are excluded.  As a result, 
research on remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa is far behind that done on other regions.  This 
paper takes a step in that direction. 
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WHAT DRIVES REMITTANCE FLOWS 
Remittances are first and foremost private money and goods, which means that senders and 
recipients are the main stakeholders regarding both remittances transfers and their utilization.  
Therefore, it is necessary to understand both senders’ and recipients characteristics, motivations, 
priorities, needs, difficulties and interests regarding the preferred transfer mechanisms and 
utilization of remittances.  It is this rationale that justifies the research approach and focus taken 
by this paper in measuring informal flows and attempting to uncover what drives remittance 
flows. 
However, pin pointing the most important drivers of remittance flows is difficult.  “To date, we 
know very little about how migrants make their remittance-sending decisions” (Ashraf et al. 2009, 
p.2).  There are a number of factors that have an impact on the propensity to remit.  The income 
of migrants is often seen as an important variable, but it is far from the only explanatory factor.  
This becomes apparent in light of the abovementioned stubborn response of remittance flows to 
the global economic crisis.  Migrants have not been returning home and remittance flows have 
declined only in some parts of the world, as many migrants seem to have tightened their own 
expenses in order to maintain remittance transfers (World Bank 2009).  Hence, other factors are 
potentially important, including: the migrants’ ability to save, the existence of dependants in both 
the host and recipient country, the skill or educational background of migrants, the legislative 
rules and regulations in host countries, the legal status of migrants in host countries, the degree 
of dependence and need of remittance recipients, as well as exchange rate fluctuations.  
The number of dependants of migrants, both in the home and host country, has important 
implications for the amount of remittances sent.  Studies have shown that there exists a strong 
positive correlation between the volume of remittance flows and the number of dependants in 
the home country.  It seems that this relationship holds true for this corridor too, as section VI 
will highlight further.  This correlation is negative for the opposite scenario, namely, having 
dependants in the host country to provide for.  Another, somewhat less straightforward driver 
on which little research has been done is the degree of dependence of migrants on remittance 
flows.  Do Zimbabwean migrants remit more as a share of their income than Batswana migrants 
for example, because Zimbabwe is currently worse off than Botswana?  Or, in other words, to 
what degree is the depth of poverty in the migrants’ home country correlated with remittance 
flows?  This issue goes to the heart of the discussion on the nature of remittance flows, in that it 
attempts to determine to what extent remittances are demand-, as opposed to supply-driven.  
14 
 
This discussion will be expanded upon in the sections below using the data gathered by the 
survey. 
Rather than being a driver of remittance flows, legislative rules and regulations in the host 
country dictate the channel through which remittance flows leave the country.  There are two 
main areas of a host country’s legal system that have implications for migrant remittances: 
exchange control legislation and immigration law.  Concerning the former, if regulations are 
overly restrictive, migrants will circumvent official channels and resort to using informal 
channels, as is often the case in Sub-Saharan Africa.  No matter what the rules are, migrants will 
always face the need to provide for dependants in their home countries and therefore always find 
ways to remit.  In that sense, legislative rules and regulations can either be a constraint to formal 
remittance flows, or they can be incentives towards using formal channels.  Unfortunately, as will 
be discussed thoroughly below, the current legislative rules and regulations in South Africa 
impose constraints on formal remittance flows, both by driving up costs of formal channels and 
by excluding the majority of migrants from them.  
Concerning immigration law, the accessibility to formal channels is influenced to a large degree 
by the legal status of migrants in the host country.  Immigration law therefore has implications 
for remittance flows, particularly whether they are formal or informal.  Studies have also shown 
that the legal status of migrants influences their economic behaviour, in terms of both 
consumption and sending remittances.  Using a survey of migrants living in Italy’s Lombardy 
region, Fasani et al. (2009) conclude that undocumented migrants tend to remit four to five times 
more, relative to their income and consumption, and consume 30-40 per cent less than 
documented migrants.  The authors attribute this finding due to the uncertainty they face 
regarding the duration of stay in host country, employment and income, among other factors 
(ibid).  The paper also notes not only that a higher percentage of undocumented migrants than 
documented migrants remit, but also that undocumented migrants remit nine per cent more as a 
share of their monthly income.  This has direct implications for the case of Zimbabwean 
migrants in South Africa, particularly because the majority are undocumented.  
Although the costs of remittance channels in this corridor are high relative to other regions in 
the world, this does not seem to be a significant constraint to the volume of remittance flows.  
Research has shown that remittance flows are less sensitive to the costs of transfers than to 
fluctuations in the migrants’ income.  This was a finding in a remittance survey of 10,000 Black 
and Minority Ethnic (BME) households in Britain in 2006, which concluded that the majority of 
migrants view costs as a ‘necessary evil’ and seem to have a fixed value in mind of what they can 
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afford to remit.  Hence, most migrants would be unlikely to remit much more if costs fell (Boon 
2006).  The extent to which these findings are applicable to the case of the South Africa-
Zimbabwe remittance corridor will be discussed in section VIII.   
Moreover, remittances seem to respond to changes in the exchange rate, just as traded goods do, 
for example.  This is exemplified by two recent episodes in the remittance flows to Mexico and 
India in 2008.  In the case of remittances to Mexico from the US, 2008 saw a sharp increase in 
remittances during the months in which the US dollar got significantly stronger against the peso.  
It appears that the more advantageous exchange rate must have encouraged workers to send 
additional money home (World Bank 2009).  A similar story showing the impact of exchange 
rate fluctuations occurred in India in the same year, when the combination of a weak rupee and 
higher interest rates in India vis-a-vis other Indian migrant hosting countries may have gone a 
long way towards explaining the huge spike in the flow of remittances from Indians living abroad 
(ibid).  Such fluctuations however, are never wholly positive, even when, as in these two cases, 
they lead to a temporary spike in flows.   
In some cases, exchange rate arrangements can have fundamental impacts on the choice between 
sending cash or goods, as happened in the South Africa-Zimbabwe corridor during the years of 
Zimbabwean hyperinflation and resulting dual exchange rate.  As noted above, the majority of 
remittances shifted from monetary transfers to transfers of goods.  The grossly overvalued 
official rate of the Zimbabwean Dollar discouraged the transfer of money through formal 
channels, such as bank transfers or postal orders, because these were subjected to the much 
lower official exchange rate.  Moreover, the hyperinflation of the Zimbabwean Dollar and the 
general deterioration of the economy meant that there was an acute shortage of goods.  Against 
this background, sending goods was a rational economic decision by migrants, in addition to 
satisfying specific consumption demands and core basic needs of recipients. 
As a final point, the drivers of remittances are often too complex to measure, which inevitably 
leaves considerable room for interpretation.  For example, migrants’ motivations to remit are 
guided by differing preference structures, personalities, lifestyles, habits and even future 
aspirations.  All of these are almost impossible to quantify, but they potentially go a long way in 
explaining why one migrant with the same income and the same number of children at home 
remits less than another migrant with those same characteristics. 
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DEVELOPMENTAL IMPACTS OF REMITTANCES 
Numerous studies have shown that remittances have a significant impact on economic 
development, by being a stimulus for poverty alleviation, improving education, reducing infant 
mortality, entrepreneurship and financial development.  There are a number of characteristics of 
remittances that highlight their positive influence on development.   
The first is that remittances flow directly into the incomes of recipient households and are 
thereby well-aligned to address the problems faced and reduce poverty.  Compiling data from a 
large number of countries, Adams and Page (2005) found that a 10 per cent increase in the share 
of remittances in a country’s GDP is typically associated with a 1.6 per cent decline in the share 
of people living in poverty.  Although this is a generalised claim, it is backed by a considerable 
amount of research from case studies around the world that highlight the positive influence of 
remittances on poverty reduction.  Using a 2006 household survey in Mali, for example, Gubert 
et al. (2009) found that remittances reduce poverty rates by 5-11 per cent and the Gini coefficient 
by about five per cent.9   Similarly, household survey data in Uganda has shown that an increase 
in remittances reduced the poverty headcount ratio by 11 percentage points over the past decade 
(Ratha and Mohapatra 2007).  
The second noteworthy characteristic of remittances is that they are often used to finance 
education, health and entrepreneurship, all of which usually have a high social return.  One 
potent example is a study of Mexican municipalities that found that a 7.7 per cent increase in the 
proportion of households receiving remittances was correlated with five per cent decrease of 
infant mortality and a 39 per cent decrease in illiteracy as well as a 3.7 per cent increase in school 
attendance (Orrenius et al. 2009).  Moreover, the level of poverty and social marginalisation 
declined (ibid).  Another study in Mexico found that households with migrants were shown to 
invest more in small businesses, on average, than households without migrants (Woodruff and 
Zenteno 2007)10 .  Similar results were replicated in many Latin American countries.  In El 
Salvador, households receiving more remittances have higher rates of child schooling (Cox-
Edwards and Ureta 2003).  In Guatemala, international remittances were associated with lower 
depth and severity of poverty (Adams 2004), while households receiving remittances tended to 
invest more in education, health and housing (Adams 2005).  This positive outcome also holds 
steady in other parts of the world, such as Asia.  Households in the Philippines that experienced 
exogenous increases in remittances became more likely to leave poverty status, to send their 
                                                          
9 Gubert et al. (2009) note that these are likely to be lower-bound results, given the conservative nature of the 
assumptions made. 
10 Other studies that have shown that remittances promote entrepreneurship include Massey and Parrado (1998); 
Maimbo and Ratha (2005) and Yang (2005). 
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children to school and to invest in new entrepreneurial enterprises (Yang 2008).  Finally, 
Aggarwal et al. (2006) showed that remittances can have a positive impact on financial 
development. 
A third characteristic of remittance flows is that by favouring the poor and being more evenly 
distributed across and within developing countries than private capital flows, they have also been 
shown to reduce inequality (World Bank 2005).  To understand this, one needs to realise that the 
composition of the migrant population in terms of skills, education, social and cultural 
background is a key determinant of the impact of remittances on income and income 
distribution.  It follows intuitively that the poorer and less educated the migrant, the more 
equalizing the impact of remittances.  This is exacerbated by the fact that low-skilled migrants 
tend to remit more, at least relative to their income (Gubert et al. 2009).  There are three main 
reasons for this: they tend to migrate alone, on average they spend less time in the host country, 
and their relatives being poorer, they have more incentives and/or pressure to remit (ibid).  
Empirical evidence for this was provided in a working paper by Schiff et al. (2008), which found 
a negative impact of the share of migrants with tertiary education on the amount of remittances.  
The bottom line is that remittance flows usually decrease inequality.  In Sri Lanka, for example, 
households from the third through the eighth income deciles moved up the income ladder 
thanks to remittances in 1999-2000 (World Bank 2005). 
A fourth, less quantifiable characteristic of remittances is that, unlike other forms of aid, they 
usually do not carry any obligations, constraints or preconditions as they are not generally 
subjected to government interference.   Throughout the history of development economics, 
foreign aid has always remained a contentious issue, primarily because its development impact 
was often marred by various inefficiencies, corruption and other absorption constraints.  Foreign 
aid processes are still not wholly efficient, as the 2008 OECD report on monitoring aid 
effectiveness concluded 11 .  In comparison to the drawbacks of traditional development 
assistance, remittances are not channelled through intermediaries and therefore avoid absorption 
and corruption.  Hence, although proving this statistically has not yet been undertaken, there is a 
consensus that “remittances may be more efficient as a source of development finance than 
official development assistance” (Kireyev 2006), because they are a direct and market-driven way 
of getting money and goods to the needy.  
                                                          
11 OECD, “Better aid: 2008 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration, Making Aid more Effective by 2015”, see 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/41/41202121.pdf 
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Another characteristic of remittances is that, unlike other international capital flows, they are 
stable in times of economic downturns, and in many cases even countercyclical (Ratha 2007).  
Migrants tend to send more funds to help their families in hard times; for example, remittances 
as a share of personal consumption expenditure rose in Indonesia and the Philippines following 
a financial crisis (Yang 2006).  In the face of the recent global economic recession, this makes 
talking about remittances particularly pertinent.  As the World Bank’s chief economist on 
remittances, Dilip Ratha, recently wrote, migrants have been “thrust into the role of a sort of 
lender of last resort” by developing countries facing shortages of hard currency (World Bank 
2009).  Indeed, in Sub-Saharan Africa, where official aid flows have long fluctuated from year to 
year, remittances have been more stable than both FDI and official aid (Gupta et al. 2007).  
Moreover, remittances have been shown to directly impact the income, welfare and consumption 
and investment behaviour of households.  Adams et al. (2008), after controlling for systematic 
differences between households that receive remittances or not, find not only that remittance 
income in Ghana is treated like any other source of income, but also that remittance receiving 
households spend more at the margin on education than those without remittances.  Thus, the 
authors conclude that remittances have a positive impact on economic development by 
increasing the level of investment in human capital (ibid).  Furthermore, remittances have been 
shown to help families in Burkina Faso overcome capital constraints and invest in livestock 
production (Wouterse and Taylor 2008). 
Beyond these direct effects, there are also indirect multiplier effects that benefit not only the 
welfare of recipients, but also benefit the communities and provinces where remittances flow.  
Durand et al. (1996) found that each dollar of remittance sent from the US to Mexico increased 
Mexican GDP by $2.90, attributed to mostly the effect of an increase in demand.  The steady 
flow of money to households can lead to job creation, particularly in local communities, where it 
is mostly spent.  Consumption creates jobs, for example in the housing industry and has led to 
construction booms in many developing countries that benefit from remittances.  “We have a 
construction boom across the country.  This is an important safeguard against poverty and helps 
to modernise our rural society” stated Mohammed Ameur, Minister for Emigres in Morocco 
(The Economist, January 3rd 2008, p.52).  Although the indirect multiplier effects of remittance 
flows are difficult to measure, it is clear that they are potentially significant.  
As impressive as the above-cited impacts of remittances on development seem to be, however, 
the nature of remittances, their utilization and their ultimate development impacts are often 
unclear and mixed.  A theoretical drawback of remittances is that, as with aid, oil revenues and 
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other unearned types of wealth, a flow of cash risks making recipients passive, dependent and 
unproductive.  In some cases, remittances may act as an insurance device, thus carrying the risk 
of moral hazard and leading to reduced work incentives in households that rely on them.  Azam 
and Gubert (2005) found this to be the case in the rural Kayes region of Mali, where remittance 
receiving households tended to be less productive.  This is, however, a much-contested motion.  
The opposite conclusion was drawn, namely that remittances boost productivity, by several 
studies, including Lopez-Feldman and Taylor (2007), who find that remittances raise productivity 
in rural Mexican households through increased investment. 
It must be kept in mind that measuring the net impact of remittances is complex and 
multifaceted.  Although correlations are often found, proving causality is more difficult (World 
Bank 2005).  To understand all facets of the interplay between remittances and various measures 
of development, one must take into account that migration is expensive, and often the poorest 
cannot migrate.  As a result, the poorest households in developing countries, many of them in 
rural areas, do not receive a proportionate share of overall remittances (ibid).  Cuba is a case in 
point, being a recipient of large remittance inflows, but with the majority of the poorer Afro-
Cuban population not having relatives abroad and thus not receiving any remittances.  As noted 
by the Inter American Dialogue recently 12 , “social inequality in Cuba is growing and class 
divisions are merging along lines marked in part by access to remittances” (Wander 2009:2).  
Hence, the impact of remittances is not always straightforward and must be analysed case by 
case. 
 
POTENTIAL MACROECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF REMITTANCES 
Remittances can have significant macroeconomic effects, which are manifested in impacts on 
foreign exchange rates, domestic interest rates and the balance of payments.  For countries 
receiving a large volume of remittances, usually anything above five per cent of GDP according 
to the World Bank, remittances can impact macroeconomic dynamics (World Bank 2006).  
During the recession that followed the global financial crisis in 2008-2009, it was feared that if 
remittances drop enough, several small, remittance-dependant countries could face the risk of 
macroeconomic imbalances, rising poverty and unemployment, social discontent and the return 
of large numbers of migrant workers (World Bank 2009).  Fortunately, none of these fears seem 
to have materialised. 
                                                          
12  Online article: “Remittances to Cuba hold steady, sources diverge” on Inter-American Dialogue website: 
http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=1845, accessed 22/06/2010.   
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Remittance inflows may also have indirect repercussions on several macro-variables, such as 
access to international capital markets.  For example, they can improve a country’s 
creditworthiness and thereby enhance its access to international capital markets (World Bank 
2006).  In many countries, “the ratio of debt to exports of goods and services, a key 
indebtedness indicator, would increase significantly if remittances were excluded from the 
denominator figure” (ibid, p. 101).  As a result, credit ratings would be improved.  A second 
example of the potential positive impact of remittances on international capital market access 
concerns the securitization of future remittance flows13.  Banks in several developing countries, 
such as Brazil, have been able to raise relatively cheap and long-term financing in this way (ibid).  
Moreover, the resilience of remittances during the financial crisis “has highlighted their 
importance in countries facing external financing gaps” (World Bank 2010:1).  Remittances are 
now being factored into sovereign ratings in middle-income countries and debt sustainability 
analysis in low-income countries.   
However, the macroeconomic repercussions of large remittance inflows are not always positive.  
Being an inflow of foreign currency, if remittances represent a significant share of GDP they 
could result in an appreciation of the domestic currency, known as the ‘Dutch Disease’ 
phenomenon.  This can potentially lead to a loss in export competitiveness.  This argument has 
been empirically backed by a number of studies, including Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2004) 
who, using data from 13 Latin American countries, found that a doubling of workers’ 
remittances would lead to a 22 per cent real exchange rate appreciation.  Lopez et al. (2007) 
mirror these results at a global level, while Bourdet and Falk (2006) attribute a 14 per cent 
increase in the real exchange rate of Cape Verde in the past decade to the doubling of 
remittances.  However, due to the nature of remittances, being stable over the long term, usually 
relatively evenly distributed across the population and spent largely on non-tradable goods, such 
gradual appreciation of the real exchange rate is in most cases not of serious consequence for 
affected countries.  Indeed, most evidence seems to dismiss a negative effect (Gubert et al, 2009).   
However, the complex dynamics between migration, remittances and development have long 
been among the least researched and understood topics.  Remittances have not received 
sufficient attention from policy makers in the countries of origin (McKinley 2003).  Although 
this has started changing over the past decade, the development potential of remittances has not 
yet been fully exploited.  Nonetheless, those countries that have understood the untapped 
potential of remittances have devised strategies to encourage the flow and effective use of 
                                                          
13 For a description of what this entails, see Annex 2.  
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remittances14.  As the next section will show, this is not the case in the South Africa-Zimbabwe 
corridor.  
 
III. EXISTING DATA AND STUDIES OF THE SOUTH AFRICA-ZIMBABWE CORRIDOR 
As was highlighted by the examples above, the literature on the interplay between remittances 
and development has grown considerably over the past decade, but the research that has been 
done on remittances in Southern Africa generally, and in the South Africa-Zimbabwe corridor in 
particular, is limited.  This is in large part due to a lack of reliable data on both migration and 
remittance flows in this region.  There have been several studies on international migration from 
Zimbabwe to South Africa 15 , but only few of these have analyzed the role of remittances.  
Indeed, because of the lack of official data from Zimbabwe over most of the last decade, there 
have been almost no studies on formal remittance flows, and even less on the far more common 
informal transfers.  This represents a significant gap in research in the field of migration and 
development in this region, particularly due to the scale of undocumented Zimbabwean 
migration to South Africa and the importance that remittances have for Zimbabwe.   
There have, however, been a handful of studies published over the last five years that have 
analysed the South Africa-Zimbabwe remittance corridor, including: Maphosa (2004 and 2007), 
Bloch (2005), Pendleton et al (2006), Makina (2007), Kerzner (2009) and Tevera and Chikanda 
(2009).  Although they approach the subject from slightly different angles, each conclude that the 
importance of remittance flows is vast.  Maphosa (2007), for example, finds that remittances are 
the most important source of income for the majority of households in southern Zimbabwe.  
Tevera and Chikanda (2009) arrive at the same conclusion, arguing that “without remittance 
flows, the situation of many Zimbabwean households would be even more dire than it is 
already” (p.4).  
All of these studies are, however, based on a few, limited sources of data.  Both Pendleton et al 
(2006) and Tevera and Chikanda (2009) are based on a Migration and Remittances Survey 
(MARS) conducted by the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) in 2005.  The household 
level survey was carried out in five SADC countries, including Zimbabwe16.  It collected data 
from 723 urban and rural households in Zimbabwe.  It found that remittances have a “crucial 
importance to household survival” in Zimbabwe, with three-quarters of surveyed households 
                                                          
14 For example: Lopez et al. (2001); McKinley (2003); Orozco (2003); Stein (2003).    
15 For example: Zinyama (1990) and (2000); Paton (1995); ILO/SAMAT (1998); and Kanyenze (2004). 
16 The other four were: Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland. 
22 
 
receiving remittances in the year prior to the study (Tevera and Chikanda 2009, p.2).  The 
importance of remittances is further underlined by the finding that no other source of income 
was even remotely as significant as remittances.  For example, “despite the overall significance of 
informal sector trade in Zimbabwe, only 15 per cent of households generated income in this 
way” (ibid, p.4).   
The results of the MARS survey were mirrored by a survey of 150 households carried out in a 
rural area in Zimbabwe’s Matabeleland South Province in 2004.  It found that 68.7 per cent have 
at least one member of the household that had migrated to South Africa (Maphosa, 2004: 9).   
Moreover, just 23 per cent of households in the sample with a family member abroad did not 
receive remittances.  Maphosa attributes this in part to the idea that remittances are culturally 
expected, as exemplified by the fact that there are derogatory terms used for migrants who do 
not send money home.  In a follow-up paper in 2007 entitled “Remittances and Development: 
the Impact of Migration to South Africa on rural livelihoods in southern Zimbabwe”, Maphosa 
concludes that in order to realise and unleash the full development potential of remittances in 
Zimbabwe, the correct strategies, regulations and policies that encourage the flow and 
investment of remittances must be put in place in South Africa.  At present, “there is no 
proactive policy to influence the flow and impact of remittances from undocumented migrants 
working in South Africa” (ibid, p.132). 
A third set of data in the field of Zimbabwean migrant remittances is a survey in 2004 by Bloch 
of almost 1000 Zimbabwean migrants, half living in the UK and the other half living in South 
Africa.   It also highlights the importance of remittance flows by finding that 81 per cent of 
employed migrants that were surveyed sent remittances to Zimbabwe (Bloch 2005, p.80).  The 
paper as a whole, however, takes a predominantly social policy approach.  For example, the 
paper’s main conclusion is that there are significant barriers faced by migrants in terms of 
opportunities for employment, education and the use of skills in both of these host countries.  
As a result, Bloch argues that the best way to stem the flow of migrants is to make a ‘real 
commitment’ towards reducing poverty in migrant sending countries such as Zimbabwe, by 
improving the opportunities for migrants in the destination country (ibid).  Although this is 
undoubtedly a justified conclusion, as a finding it doesn’t do much to advance the policy debate.  
In this sense, Bloch’s paper lacks the detailed political-economy analysis that could offer new 
insights and tangible propositions.   
More importantly, all three of these sets of data were obtained through surveys conducted in 
2004-2005 and are thus outdated, because migration and remittance patterns and numbers in the 
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corridor have evolved substantially in response to the rapidly deteriorating economic situation in 
Zimbabwe from 2004 to early 2009.   
Nonetheless, the only survey data collected on remittance flows in this corridor since these three 
studies in 2004-2005 is a pilot study of 4654 migrant Zimbabweans in Johannesburg conducted 
in June-July 200717.  The study still represents the most comprehensive data on Zimbabwean 
migrants in South Africa.  The primary focus of the study, however, was not remittances, but 
rather creating a profile of the Zimbabwean migrant community in Johannesburg.  As such, the 
study did not go into great detail about remittance behaviour and patterns, and did not 
distinguish between in-kind and pecuniary remittance transfers, for example.  Moreover, the data 
was gathered in mid-2007, at the height of the hyperinflation in Zimbabwe, and the economic 
situation has shifted considerably since then.  Therefore, although to a lesser degree than the 
2004-2005 studies, both the accuracy and the current applications of this study are limited.   
The most recent study in this field was conducted in 2009 by Kerzner18 and offers the most up-
to-date overview of the South Africa-Zimbabwe remittance corridor.  The drawback is that it did 
not collect survey data, but rather simply gathered data through a few dozen interviews, and 
therefore it predominantly cites the aforementioned, outdated studies.  Moreover, it focuses only 
on Zimbabwean migrants in Johannesburg.  Nonetheless, the study offers some interesting 
insights.  First and foremost, it concludes that “Zimbabwe is heavily reliant on remittance flows 
from South Africa” (Kerzner 2009, p.1).  It also highlights that many Zimbabwean migrants are 
undocumented and are thus excluded from accessing formal remittance channels.  Another key 
finding of the study is that until recently, much of the value transferred back to Zimbabwe took 
the form of basic groceries, cleaning and medical supplies, clothing and other household items, 
due to the scarcity of these goods in Zimbabwe.  It argues, however, that remittance flows seem 
to have started undergoing a transition towards an increasing share of monetary transfers that 
was driven by the formation of the unity government in February 2009 and the early economic 
reforms that were implemented.  Although it was “too early to tell at the time of the study”, the 
paper argued that “this shift back towards monetary transfers will play a significant role in the 
recovery of the country” (ibid, p.vii).   
                                                          
17 The study was conducted by the Mass Public Opinion Institute in partnership with the Zimbabwe Diaspora Civil 
Society Organizations Forum, and in cooperation with IDASA.  The findings were analyzed and the report written 
by Professor Daniel Makina of the University of South Africa.  
18 The study is entitled “Cash and Carry: Understanding the Johannesburg-Zimbabwe Remittance Corridor” and 
was commissioned by the Centre for Financial Regulation and Inclusion (Cenfri). 
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As becomes apparent, there are still some gaps in the existing literature and especially in the data 
in the South Africa-Zimbabwe remittance corridor.  Not only is most of the data outdated, but, 
it is also exclusively focused on migrants in Johannesburg.  In partial result of this, there are gaps 
in the existing literature where it fails to analyse certain key aspects of the current remittance 
landscape.  Therefore, new data is essential in order to gain a clearer understanding of the 
current remittance flows and dynamics.   
This paper aims to add to the existing literature in two key ways.  Firstly, it provides up-to-date 
survey data on remittance patterns and volumes sent by Zimbabwean migrants.  Although the 
sample size is relatively small at 350 respondents, and is thus not large enough to draw 
statistically valid conclusions, it provides an instructive and much-needed snapshot of the 
present dynamics.  This paper’s second key contribution is that it focuses on areas where past 
studies have not put sufficient emphasis.  For example, it approaches the issue from the supply-
side by focusing primarily on the senders’ priorities, needs, difficulties and interests regarding the 
preferred transfer mechanisms.  As such it contributes to a central aspect of the analysis of this 
remittance corridor. 
 
IV. ZIMBABWEAN MIGRATION TO SOUTH AFRICA 
South Africa has historically been a magnet for Zimbabwean migration because of its relative 
proximity, abundant economic opportunities, and cultural and language similarities facilitate easy 
assimilation.  However, following the collapse of the economy and the deterioration of the 
socio-political situation, migration to South Africa has increased continuously over the past 
decade and reached new dimensions altogether.  As a result, so too has the volume and the 
importance of remittance flows to Zimbabwe increased considerably.  Before analysing the key 
characteristics of the South Africa-Zimbabwe remittance corridor, it is useful to first highlight 
the extent and nature of Zimbabwean migration to South Africa.  
BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION IN ZIMBABWE 
The humanitarian crisis reached its peak in 2008, with an estimated unemployment rate of close 
to 90 per cent throughout 2008-2009, hyperinflation spiralling out of control, and a severe 
drought that further constrained the already vastly depleted agricultural production.  As a result, 
over half of the population was in need of receiving food aid (WFP 2008).  Much of previous 
progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) was reversed, with various 
measures of poverty, child mortality and maternal health falling (see Annex 4).  Due to the 
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hyperinflation, Zimbabwean’s purchasing power eroded rapidly.  According to a Gallup poll 
conducted in March 2008, 84 per cent found living on their present income difficult (45 per cent) 
or very difficult (39 per cent)19.   According to a more recent Gallup Poll published in November 
2009, an average of 55 per cent of Zimbabweans between 2007-2009 said they would like to 
emigrate if they had the chance; making Zimbabwe a close second only to the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, at 60 per cent.20  The bottom line is that between two and three million 
people, which represents up to a quarter of the population, have emigrated in the last decade, 
and about half of these just in the last three years (Makina 2007).   
Following the heavily disputed elections in April 2008 and the formation of a unity government 
ten months later in February 2009, the first steps towards a normalisation of political and 
economic circumstances were taken.  The first economic reforms, such as the decision to allow 
the use of hard currencies in place of the Zimbabwe Dollar and the scrapping of price controls, 
alongside the end of Zimbabwe’s drought, have renewed some degree of agricultural 
productivity, led to greater price stability and have returned some goods to the grocery store 
shelves.   
Nonetheless, almost a year and a half after the formation of the unity government, the country 
remains in a deadlock as the ZANU-PF and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) fail 
to make the power-sharing agreement work effectively.  As a result, the much-needed foreign 
investment remains largely absent, unemployment is still above 80 per cent, and Zimbabweans 
are still crossing the southern border in search for work in South Africa to support their families 
in Zimbabwe. 
Against this background, it becomes clear how vital remittances have been, and presently are, to 
Zimbabwe.  Indeed, remittances flows were estimated to have doubled in 2009, according to the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), but accurate figures are difficult to 
project, as will be discussed in the next section.  Although figures remain unclear, even 
conservative estimates of the magnitude highlight that remittance flows into Zimbabwe played a 
large role in staving off the country’s complete collapse in recent years.  This is confirmed by the 
finding in 2008 that 40 per cent of Zimbabweans said they depended on receiving money from 
family members working in other countries, a steep increase from the 26 per cent recorded in 
2006 (Gallup 2008).   
                                                          
19 Gallup, 2008, ‘Many Zimbabweans Lacking Basic Necessities’, available online at: 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/109462/Many-Zimbabweans-Lacking-Basic-Necessities.aspx. Accessed  02/02/2010. 
20 Gallup, 2009, ‘700 Million Worldwide Desire to Migrate Permanently’, available online at: 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/124028/700-Million-Desire-Migrate-Permanently.aspx. Accessed 02/02/2010.  
26 
 
SIZE OF THE ZIMBABWEAN MIGRANT COMMUNITY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Determining an accurate estimate for the size of the Zimbabwean migrant community in South 
Africa is of great importance because inaccurate information on the number of foreigners can 
lead to misguided perceptions and inappropriate policy interventions.  However, measuring 
migration flows is extremely difficult and estimates have long been a source of serious 
disagreement.  Respected media and NGOs have recently cited that the number of 
Zimbabweans living in South Africa is around three million21.  However, this number is almost 
definitely too high.22  In a background paper published in 2008, the Forced Migration Studies 
Program (FSMP) at the University of Witwatersrand dismissed the three million figure noting 
that it was either extrapolated from data that cannot be generalised (such as statistics on 
deportations, border crossings or asylum applications) or that it was simply based on conjecture 
(FSMP 2008).   
Determining an accurate estimate of the number of Zimbabweans in South Africa has thus far 
been precluded by a lack of reliable data.  The last census was in 2001, and therefore the 2007 
Community Survey by Statistics South Africa is the most recent national data available.  It found 
the total number of foreign-born residents is just over 1.2 million, or 2.79 per cent of the total 
population.  However, this is almost definitely an underestimate, not only because migrants are 
hard to track down, but also because there are a number of factors that incentivize Zimbabweans 
not to disclose their nationality.  Many migrants enter South Africa illegally, having fled 
economic hardship and, in some cases, political persecution, and want to avoid deportation.  
Moreover, following the xenophobic violence in 2008 and the ever-present tension towards and 
discrimination of foreigners, usually in the form of higher rent charges and lower wages, 
Zimbabweans usually prefer not to stick out.  This is assisted by the third point, namely that due 
to language, cultural and physiological similarities to South Africans, Zimbabweans find it easy to 
blend in and assimilate.  Finally, because many Zimbabwean migrants go back and forth and stay 
in the country for only a few months at a time, they are hard to keep track of.  Thus, for the 
purpose of determining the number of Zimbabweans in South Africa, the Community Survey is 
inaccurate and almost certainly an underestimate.   
                                                          
21For example, Medecins Sans Frontieres on June 2nd, 2009, “Zimbabweans Struggle in the Shadows of South 
African Society”: http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news/article.cfm?id=3543&cat=field-news; or BBC 
News Online on March 16th,  2010, “Jacob Zuma bid to ease Zimbabwe coalition tension”: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8569153.stm.  The Mail & Guardian, Bloomberg Times and the Christian Science 
Monitor have also quoted similarly high figure recently. 
22 It seems to stem from 1996 Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) report that is still being cited on the 
Department of Home Affairs Website.  This report was based on a flawed survey and has since been retracted.   
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A study done at the University of South Africa in 2007 based on Zimbabweans living in inner-
city Johannesburg concluded that there were just over one million Zimbabweans nationwide 
(Makina 2007); this is considered a fair finding by most experts.  However, the study was done in 
2007 and hence before the worst of the economic implosion, humanitarian crisis, political strife 
and violence in Zimbabwe.  Therefore, this number has undoubtedly increased considerably in 
the last three years.  It is now widely agreed that between one and a half and two million 
Zimbabwean migrants live and work in South Africa.  This represents an inflow of people that is 
unprecedented in South Africa.  Even taking the lowest estimates of numbers, for example, 
Zimbabweans are the biggest migrant group there has ever been in South Africa, even surpassing 
the numbers of Mozambican migrants during the civil war (FSMP 2007). 
 
V. THE SURVEY RESULTS 
In April 2010 a survey23 was carried out of 347 Zimbabwean migrants living in South Africa’s 
Western Cape Province.  The primary purpose of the survey was to gather data on remittance-
sending patterns of Zimbabwean migrants in order to assess both the key drivers of and 
constraints to remitting from South Africa.  In addition to the survey, a considerable number of 
interviews with key stakeholders24 as well as several focus group discussions with Zimbabwean 
migrants were carried out.  In the face of a lack of research and data on Zimbabwean migration 
to South Africa, and in particular of remittance flows between the two countries, primary data 
collection was a vital part of the research for this paper.   
SURVEY DESIGN 
Precautions were taken throughout the survey design and questionnaire distribution processes to 
minimize potential biases in the results.  The survey was carried out in both a rural and an urban 
setting as a means of portraying a more balanced picture of the nature of Zimbabwean migration 
and remittance patterns in South Africa.  Of the overall sample, 207 questionnaires were 
completed in Masiphumelele, a settlement 20km south of Cape Town, and 140 were collected in 
De Doorns refugee camp, located about 180km north of Cape Town.  The allocation of the two 
sample sizes is based on rough estimates of the distribution of Zimbabwean migrants in South 
Africa: the slight majority living and working in urban areas, but a large number working in 
mining and agricultural areas (FSMP 2008).  
                                                          
23 The survey was funded by the author himself.  See Annex 5 for a sample questionnaire. 
24 Interviews: Braam Hanekom, Chairman of PASSOP; as well as a number of community leaders in Masiphumelele 
and De Doorns.  Email correspondence with Professor Daniel Makina (UNISA), Lawrence Landau (University of 
Witwatersrand), among others.  
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The survey consisted of both self-completion questionnaires and face-to-face interviews using 
non-probabilistic sampling methods. Although using different methods of data collection can 
result in so-called mode effects because the way in which questionnaires are administered can 
affect the way in which people respond (de Vaus 2002), it was necessary due to low levels of 
English language literacy of some respondents.  Probability sampling techniques could not be 
used because there is no sampling frame of Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa.  The absence 
of a sampling frame meant that the survey included only respondents who were willing to 
participate after the research objective was explained to them.  Although this minimized the non-
completion bias, there was room for potential selection biases.   
One potential selection bias could have resulted from the fact that news of the survey was 
spread, at least in part, by word of mouth.  Such a ‘snowballing’ effect may have resulted in a bias 
towards a certain income, or age group, for example.  Beyond the randomness of the sample, 
caution must also be given to potential exaggeration and inaccuracy of responses, such as 
estimating monthly income or the total value of remittances sent.  As with any survey data, 
responses are often subjective and estimates can be imprecise.   
However, these potential selection and accuracy biases were identified early on in the survey 
design and several steps were taken to ensure that they were minimized.  Firstly, hiring and 
training local staff to assist in administering the questionnaires helped improve the quality and 
accuracy of the data by encouraging respondents to think carefully and in a structured way when 
making income and remittance estimates, for example.  The local staff was also important as a 
source of trust for respondents, many of whom were undocumented and thus were often wary 
of divulging personal information.  To ensure that the sample was as random as possible, 
questionnaires were collected in different areas of the settlements.  Thirdly, anonymity of all 
respondents was guaranteed and questionnaires were administered on weekends, when the vast 
majority of Zimbabwean migrants were not at work.  As a final safeguard against inaccurate data, 
answers were screened for inconsistencies and completeness, and nine per cent of the overall 
sample was excluded from the analysis.  For example, if the amount cited for total annual income 
was not significantly larger than the amount given for the total annual amount remitted, to at 
least account for the cost of living, the questionnaire was thrown out.  
Despite these safeguards, the survey results must been seen with caution and above all, in 
context.  This quota sample of Zimbabwean migrants is intended to be an experimental 
condition, rather than a population measurement.  Because of the absence of a sampling frame 
of Zimbabweans in South Africa, as well as the relatively small sample size, the results are not 
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suited to draw statistical inferences for all of South Africa.  Rather, the survey results should be 
seen as an example of the dynamics of remittance-sending in these two Zimbabwean migrant 
communities that can serve as a useful indication of the general situation in South Africa.  For 
this objective, the sample size of the survey is large enough to smooth out outliers and 
inconsistencies in the data. 
Concerning the subjective nature of some of the questions and the resulting potential for 
imprecise answers, this is a necessary evil of any primary data collection exercise that cannot be 
avoided.  Indeed, using primary sources through questionnaires, interviews and focus group 
discussions is the only way to begin capture data on informal remittance flows.  “Surveys that ask 
how remittances are sent are likely to provide the best estimates of the size of the informal 
sector, but such surveys are only available for a handful of countries.” (Freud and Spatafora 
2005, p. 3)   
 
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF ZIMBABWEAN MIGRANT COMMUNITY 
The first half of the questionnaire consisted of questions on the social and demographic 
background of migrants, in order to be able to analyse these and the potential influence they 
have on remittance-sending behaviour and patterns.  Hence, the survey gathered data on gender, 
age, migration patterns, educational background, employment structures and income levels on 
migrants.   
The majority of respondents in the overall sample were male (69 per cent), with a more balanced 
gender distribution found in the urban setting, where only 61 per cent were male.  The scale of 
female migration from Zimbabwe is thereby higher than in most other African countries, where 
male migration is still very much the norm (UNDP 2010).  This trend is the likely product of the 
current lack of employment opportunities in Zimbabwe.  As such it is an indication of the 
unique nature of Zimbabwean migration, which permeates all layers of the population, as 
opposed to the more common seasonal migration that occurs in many parts of Africa.  
Regarding the age of the migrants, 91 per cent of respondents were between 18 and 40 years old, 
with the average age being 30 years.  Interestingly, most migrants were clustered closely around 
this average, with almost two thirds being between the ages 25 to 35.  This finding is somewhat 
higher than the age distribution found in Makina’s (2007) study of Zimbabwean migrants in 
Johannesburg.  It seems, hence, that younger migrants tend to cross the border and settle in the 
closer and more accessible Johannesburg, while more mature migrants make the move to the 
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further afield Western Cape Province.  Indeed, 61 per cent of respondents said that Cape Town 
was their first and only place of settlement in South Africa.  Of those who spent time elsewhere 
first, almost all were male and spent a short period (an average of less than one year) in 
Johannesburg before moving to Cape Town. 
The survey results seem to justify the hypothesis that Zimbabwean migration to South Africa has 
not slowed considerably following the formation of the unity government in 2008.  According to 
the survey, only 6 per cent of migrants first arrived in South Africa before 2000, when the 
controversial land reform program was first enforced and the economy began its decline.  As is 
displayed in graph 1 below, an astounding 46 per cent of survey respondents first arrived in 
South Africa post-2008.  If this finding were to hold for the whole country, it would highlight 
that remittance flows are now more important than ever.  Furthermore, it is likely that 
Zimbabwean migration to South Africa will remain high for years to come, as the recovery and 
development process in Zimbabwe is likely to be gradual.  
GRAPH 1: DURATION OF MIGRANTS’ STAY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
Taking the combined sample, surveyed migrants were predominantly from urban areas, although 
among the respondents surveyed in De Doorns, a considerable share were from rural areas.  
Overall, the largest number of respondents (just over a third) was from Harare.  The second 
most common province of origin was Manicaland, with most migrants coming from the two 
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biggest cities there, Chipinge and Mutare.  Despite this, 21 per cent reported that the closest 
bank was more than a 45 minute bus journey away.  This is due to the fact that the majority of 
respondents in De Doorns (53 per cent) came from the Mashonaland provinces, and slightly 
over a third reported that there was no bank in the vicinity of their home.  This has important 
implications for the type of remittance sending channel that is used, as will be discussed below.  
The majority of Zimbabweans in the sample were economic migrants; 77 per cent of 
respondents cited ‘to look for work’ as the principal reason for coming to South Africa.  A 
further 15 per cent cited ‘to escape political persecution’ as the main reason, and 5 per cent to be 
with family in South Africa.  This result mirrors the aforementioned findings in Bloch’s paper, as 
well as a more recent study of Zimbabweans in Musina, a border town in South Africa, by the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM).  It found that 84 per cent of respondents cited 
economic reasons and lack of employment opportunities in Zimbabwe as the main reason for 
emigrating (IOM 2009).  A recent working paper by the UNDP highlighted the varying reasons 
for Zimbabwean migration over time: between 1979 and 2001, migration was primarily for 
economic reasons, while during 2002-2004, political reasons became the most important driver 
of migration.  From 2005 onwards migration was again predominantly due to economic reasons 
(UNDP 2010).  
The vast majority of migration seems to be temporary, as opposed to permanent.  This is 
supported both by survey findings regarding the nature of migration, as well as the closeness of 
ties to family members in Zimbabwe.  About three quarters of respondents (73 per cent) said 
that they travel home at least once a year, while only 10 per cent said that they haven’t travelled 
back to Zimbabwe in over two years.  These results are further underlined by the finding that 
almost all migrants that took part in the survey, 93 per cent, said that they would move back to 
Zimbabwe permanently, ‘if things got better there’.  Although that leaves considerable room for 
interpretation, it shows that it is the objective of most migrants to remain in South Africa 
temporarily.  Whether or not they are able to do so depends largely on the pace of economic 
recovery in Zimbabwe.  
The hypothesis that most migration is temporary is further reinforced by the resounding number 
of respondents that support families in Zimbabwe.  According to the survey results, 84 per cent 
support at least one child in Zimbabwe, and of these, 77 per cent said they had two or more 
children there.  Indeed, 96 per cent of respondents said they had family in Zimbabwe that are 
dependent on their remittances, whether or not they are able to send them.  These findings are 
similar to those of the aforementioned IOM study, which found the majority of those 
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interviewed had four or more people in Zimbabwe depending on the remittances sent home 
(IOM 2009).  This issue of dependants is one of the key drivers of remittance flows, as will be 
discussed in section VI below.  
A surprisingly high number of surveyed migrants have dependants in South Africa.  Almost a 
third support children that are in South Africa.  This finding reinforces the idea that the nature 
of Zimbabwean migration to South Africa may be changing towards bringing more family 
members over to South Africa, as migrants realise that there is no ‘quick fix’ for the lack of 
economic opportunities in Zimbabwe.  Alternatively, many of these migrants may be starting 
families in South Africa, which has even more permanent implications for migration patterns. 
The education standard among the combined sample was relatively high.  Of all respondents, 70 
per cent said they completed at least eleven years of school and obtained their so-called ‘O-level’.  
Moreover, of the total sample, 35 per cent completed some kind of post-secondary education 
before leaving Zimbabwe.  Again, this finding is supported by both Bloch’s (2005) and in 
Makina’s (2007) surveys.  In relation to migrants from other SADC countries, Zimbabweans are 
amongst the most educated, on average (UNDP 2010).  However, there is a significant 
divergence between the results from the rural, as opposed to the urban migrants.  While in 
Masiphumelele, 81 per cent of respondents said they obtained their O-level, in De Doorns, only 
54 per cent achieved the same standard.  
Despite the relatively strong educational record, the average monthly income of survey 
respondents was just R1826, and is lower than the average personal monthly income in South 
Africa, which is estimated to be about R2,100 (FinScope 2008).  However, the majority of 
respondents found some kind of employment and worked between six and ten months last year.  
The median value was lower for both those measures, since only 30 per cent of migrants earned 
more than that average and only 25 per cent were employed for more than 10 months out of the 
year.   
The disparity between rural and urban migrants is most visible in terms of average annual 
income, because this measure takes into account the months per year that employment was 
secured.  In De Doorns, only 40 per cent of respondents were employed for more than six 
months (compared to 77 per cent in Masiphumelele).  This is due to the seasonal nature of farm 
labour.  Moreover, due to the surplus of cheap labour, there is considerable exploitation of 
migrants in rural areas, not only to work long hours, but wages often just R5 per hour.  As a 
result, the average monthly wages amounted to only R1135 in De Doorns, as opposed to R2300 
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in Masiphumelele.  By multiplying the number of months worked by the monthly income for 
each migrant, the annual total income can be obtained.  While respondents in Masiphumele 
earned R 19,430 on average per year, Zimbabweans in De Doorns only earned R 7,540.  This 
disparity is shown in graph 2 below.  
GRAPH 2: RURAL VS. URBAN INCOME 
 
 
Out of the combined sample, the majority of migrants are in cash jobs.  Only 9 per cent of 
respondents said that they got paid for their work through a bank transfer, as opposed to cash.  
This could be seen as an indication of the fact that the majority of Zimbabwean migrants are 
undocumented, and hence have no access to banking services.  Once again, these results confirm 
findings by similar studies conducted in Johannesburg.  Interestingly, of those that got paid via 
bank transfer, and are hence documented migrants, the average monthly income was R 3,320, 
compared to the average of just R 1,680 for surveyed migrants that were paid in cash.  As a 
whole, hence, it seems that the undocumented status of Zimbabwe migrants was an obstacle to 
securing better paid employment.  This notion, and the implications that it has on the remittance 
behaviour of migrants will be further discussed below.  
REMITTANCE-SENDING BEHAVIOUR AND PATTERNS 
The nature and patterns of remittance flows in Africa are different from other regions in the 
world due to a number of key reasons.  Firstly, most of Africa’s migration is intraregional.  
Migration in Africa tends to be confined to other regional countries that show greater 
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employment opportunities and that usually have higher scores on the Human Development 
Index (UNDP 2010).  According to a World Bank study, 69 per cent of total migration flows in 
Sub-Saharan Africa are regional (Ratha 2007).  Another characteristic that sets Africa apart is that 
due to the lack of financial saturation, Africa has the highest usage rates of informal remittance 
channels.  Thirdly, compared to all other continents, money transfers, especially within Africa, 
are the most problematic because, at least in most countries, they are impacted by regulatory 
environments that impede competition (IFAD 2008).   
Indeed, there is a persistence of monopolies on transfers by banks and MTOs that drive up the 
costs within the continent.  In all of Western Africa, for example, 70 per cent of official 
payments are handled by one MTO, which demands exclusivity in money transfers of the banks 
(IFAD 2008).  As a direct result, remittance sending costs in Africa are higher than in other parts 
of the world.  The outcome is that remittance senders get less value for their money and 
remittance receivers do not receive as much as they could.  In the face of high costs of the 
formal channels, informal remittance channels emerge as a solution to the need to remit (ibid), 
thus helping to explain why such high rates of informality are recorded across the board in 
Africa.  The extent to which these factors are replicated in South Africa will be discussed in this 
section. 
South Africa is a country that records significant net remittance outflows, which places it in the 
company of developed countries that boast levels of financial development and saturation well 
beyond those currently achieved in South Africa.  Indeed, of all countries with significant net 
outflows of remittances, South Africa has the lowest GDP per capita, at US$3640 and also has 
the highest percentage of population living in rural areas, at 40 per cent (Beck and Peria 2009).  
Against this background, this section intertwines a discussion of these key factors with empirical 
evidence from the survey to paint a picture of the remittances landscape in the South Africa-
Zimbabwe remittance corridor.     
The survey results indicate that an extremely high proportion of Zimbabwean migrants send 
remittances.  Of the 326 questionnaires used in the analysis25, 92 per cent of respondents said 
that they sent remittances to family in Zimbabwe over the last twelve months.  At that, the 
percentage of migrants that remit is higher than results found in similar studies done in other 
regions, such as from migrants in Europe to their families in developing countries in general26, or 
                                                          
25 The overall sample included 347 questionnaires, but 21 were excluded from the remittances analysis due to 
incomplete or inconsistent answers.  
26 For example, Fasani et al. (2008) found that 65 per cent of migrants in Italy’s Lombardy region remit.  
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from Latino migrants in the US to Latin American countries27.  The high result of this survey is 
however replicated in similar studies in Johannesburg, which also found the percentage of 
migrants that remit to be close to 90 per cent (Makina 2007).  This finding gives testament both 
to the dire state of economic opportunities in Zimbabwe, as well as the profound dependency on 
remittances there.  Although almost all developing countries worldwide rely on remittance flows 
to some degree, the broad and deep-rooted dependence that seems to be the current reality in 
Zimbabwe is quite unique.   
The hypothesis of a deep-rooted dependence of remittance recipients in Zimbabwe is further 
substantiated by the finding that 31 per cent of total annual income of Zimbabwean migrants in 
the sample is, on average, remitted.28  This result is higher than the share of income that is 
remitted in most other regions and corridors, where the average usually falls between 20 and 30 
per cent.  As is displayed in the bar chart below, only 23 per cent of respondents remitted less 
than 20 per cent of their total income, while the majority (54 per cent) remitted between 20 and 
40 per cent of their incomes annually.   
GRAPH 3: PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL INCOME REMITTED 
 
The average total amount remitted by survey respondents was found to be about 20% higher 
than by migrants in a comparable study in Johannesburg29.  The average amount was R4700 per 
year, including both pecuniary and in-kind transfers.  This finding is somewhat higher than 
Makina’s (2007) study of Zimbabwean migrants in Johannesburg.  The divergence in results is in 
large part due to the lower average incomes of migrants in that study in Johannesburg.  Indeed, 
                                                          
27 For example, Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak (2006) found that 76 % of Mexican migrants in California remit. 
28 By multiplying the average number of months worked per year by the average monthly income earned, a total 
average annual income of R14460 was found.  Next, the value of remittances, both cash and the estimated value of 
goods, was summed up and their share of the total annual income calculated.  
29 Makina (2007). 
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as a share of their incomes, remittances sent also accounted for over 30 per cent in that sample 
(Makina 2007). 
Migrants’ remittance-sending behaviour was characterised by frequent transfers of smaller 
amounts; a finding that is also consistent with the existing studies.  The great majority of 
migrants in the sample (78 per cent) said that they send remittances at least once every three 
months, meaning that the average amount sent with each transaction was worth around R750 
every two months.  The high frequency of sending remittances is important because in the 
absence of a regular sending pattern, recipients cannot plan and budget on the receipt of 
remittances (Maphosa 2004).   
A large number of migrants seem to send in-kind remittances, making up a considerable share of 
total remittance flows.  The great majority of surveyed migrants, 88 per cent, said that they have 
remitted goods on at least one occasion over the past year.  There is a clear consensus 
throughout the existing literature on the large role of in-kind remittances.  This is attributed 
largely to the fact that over most of the past decade, Zimbabwe was suffering from a rapidly 
declining economy that manifested itself in high rates of unemployment and inflation, as well as 
falling levels of agricultural productivity that were accentuated by a severe drought.  The result 
was that goods were in severe shortage and needed to be imported.  As a result, even when 
goods were available, they were far more expensive than in South Africa.  According to this 
survey, the most common goods sent were food and clothing, which were both sent by 
approximately 70 per cent of respondents.  Household items (45 per cent), electronics (40 per 
cent), and to a lesser extent, medicine (24 per cent), were other commonly sent goods.   
As a share of the total value of remittances sent, the value of goods sent accounted for 41 per 
cent, although the results indicate a declining trend.  Indeed, this finding is somewhat lower than 
those found in Maphosa (2007) and Kerzner (2009), and it seems to indicate that remittance 
flows to Zimbabwe are evolving back towards a greater share of monetary transfers, as Kerzner 
(2009) predicted.  It seems that this trend is on the one hand due to the economic progress and 
increase of agricultural productivity over the past year; and on the other hand attributable to the 
use of the South African Rand in Zimbabwe, which not only circumvents all exchange rate 
fluctuations, but also clarifies and simplifies transmission processes.  A third factor could be the 
further distance that migrants have to transport goods from the Western Cape than from 
Johannesburg, where the other surveys were conducted.  
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Informal remittance channels were given clear preference among survey respondents.  The vast 
majority of transfers, 85 per cent, were made using various informal channels, such as giving the 
money and/or goods to friends or relatives that are travelling back to Zimbabwe (35.5 per cent) 
or by paying a bus driver or other transporter to take the remittances back (34 per cent).  Other 
informal channels included using unofficial MTOs (7.5 per cent), or simply taking the 
remittances home themselves (7 per cent), as is summarised in the pie graph below.  Only 15 per 
cent of surveyed migrants said they used primarily formal remittance channels, such as official 
MTOs30 (7 per cent), postal orders (7.5 per cent) or bank transfers (0.5 per cent).   
GRAPH 4: REMITTANCE CHANNELS USED 
 
This predominance of informal channels is confirmed by Makina’s (2007) finding that only 11 
per cent of remittances were sent through official banking channels or other formal channels.    
Indeed, there is a clear consensus in the literature that most of the cash remittances were sent 
through informal channels; a finding that is consistent with findings in most parts of Sub-
Saharan Africa.  It is in large part due to the limited access that migrants have to formal channels, 
either because they are undocumented, or because of the lack of banking facilities on the 
recipient end as many migrants come from rural areas.  These issues will be explored in greater 
detail in section VII below.  
In summary, the findings of this survey are largely consistent with the results obtained by the 
other aforementioned surveys that were carried out in Johannesburg over within the last five 
years.  The only differences seem to be the slightly older average age of migrants in the Western 
Cape and the lower relative weight of in kind remittances.  This latter point, as already 
                                                          
30 There are only two official MTO’s currently operating in South Africa: Money Gram and Western Union. 
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mentioned above, is likely to be primarily due to the gradually changing nature of the economic 
situation in Zimbabwe and the consequent evolution towards increasing monetary transfers.   
TABLE 1: SUMMARY AND COMPARISON OF SURVEY FINDINGS  
Factor Burgsdorff (2010) Makina (2007) Other 
Sample Size 347 4,654 Bloch(2005) / IOM (2009) 
Age 91% between 21 and 40 
years; average 30 
80% between 21 and 40 
years; average 27 
81% under 39 (Bloch) 
Gender 69% male 59% male 68% male (Bloch) 
Reason 77% economic ‘Predominantly’ economic 84% economic (IOM) 
Duration 94% post 2000 92% post 2000 and 
‘exponential’ annual growth 
--- 
Dependants in 
Zimbabwe 
84% support children;  
69% support 3 or more 
93% support children;  
72% support 3 or more  
‘Majority’ had 4 or more 
dependants (IOM) 
Dependants in 
South Africa 
44% 55% --- 
Education 70% O-level;  
35% post-secondary 
62% O-level; 32% post-
secondary 
82% O-level (Bloch) 
Income Average R1850; 
Masiphumelele: R2300 
Average R1900 --- 
Remitting 92% remit 89% remit 81% remit (Bloch) 
As share of income 31% 30% --- 
In kind remittances 41% of total ‘Majority’ --- 
Channels used 85% informal 89% informal ‘Minority’ formal (Bloch) 
 
THE OVERALL SIZE OF REMITTANCE FLOWS  
In the South Africa-Zimbabwe corridor, remittance flows are considerable, in large part due to 
the large number of Zimbabwean migrants assumed to be in South Africa 31 .  The most 
commonly used approach in the existing literature estimates remittance flows as a product of the 
stock of migrants abroad, the percentage of these migrants that remit, and the average annual 
amount that they remit.  Given this simple framework, the assumptions for each parameter can 
be deduced from survey results and estimations.  The total number of Zimbabweans living in 
South Africa is estimated to be between 1.5 and 2 million, as discussed above.  Based on this and 
other studies done, we assume that 85 per cent32 of Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa remit.  
Finally, estimations based on this and other survey data suggest that the average annual amount 
remitted, including both cash and the value of goods, is about R4000 33 .  Given these 
assumptions, the rough estimate34 of the likely size of remittance flows from South Africa to 
Zimbabwe last year amounts to between five and seven billion Rand; or equivalent to between 
                                                          
31 Any exercise to estimate overall remittance flows is subjected to considerable assumptions that may distort the 
accuracy of the result.  However, the findings of the survey are here applied to obtain at least an indication of the 
scale of overall remittance flows.   
32 Represents average finding of this study and studies by Maphosa (2004), Bloch (2006) and Makina (2007).  
33 This value is the average of findings by Bloch (2006) and Makina (2007).  
34 To account for the assumptions used and the resulting inaccuracy of results, estimates of remittance flows are 
given as a range, representing both the lower and upper bound estimates.  
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US$ 680-905 million35.  The following diagram displays the estimated results, by breaking this 
overall sum up by both the type of remittances and the channel used.  
DIAGRAM 1: ESTIMATED TOTAL REMITTANCE FLOWS IN SOUTH AFRICA-ZIMBABWE CORRIDOR 
Taking into account that at least a third of Zimbabwean migrants live in other foreign countries, 
predominantly the UK and Botswana (UNDP 2010), the total remittance flows into Zimbabwe 
are likely to be between US$ 1-1.5 billion annually.  This estimate is supported by a recent 
working paper published by the UNDP, which put the figure at US$ 1.4 billion.  The IMF 
forecast for private cash transfers, which includes an estimate of informal flows but excludes in-
kind transfers, was US$ 971 million for 2009.  Given that slightly over 40 per cent of flows are 
likely to be in-kind transfers, the IMF prediction falls well within this range.  Finally, considering 
that a recent study of remittance behaviour of Zimbabweans living in northern England by 
Bailey, et al., (2009) estimated that US$0.94 billion was sent from the UK alone in 2007, this 
rough estimate of the overall volume of remittance flows to Zimbabwe might still be on the 
conservative side. 
 
                                                          
35 Using the average exchange rate of the year thus far, which is US$1=ZAR7.52. 
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To put these numbers into perspective, it is useful to draw some comparisons with other 
financial inflows.  Although ODA flows to Zimbabwe in 2008 amounted to $608 million, they 
were only about half the size of remittance flows into the country.  Foreign direct investment, 
including direct investment and official transfers in the capital account, was estimated to be just 
US$152 million in 2009 (IMF 2009).  Moreover, as export receipts stagnated between 2004 and 
2008, they amounted to just over US$ 1.6 billion in 2008 (IMF 2009), and thereby were only 
somewhat larger than overall remittance inflows.  Thus, remittances are currently one of the 
greatest sources of foreign currency inflows for Zimbabwe.  
Finally, remittance flows are often presented as a share of GDP in order to indicate the weight 
they carry in the recipient country.  In Zimbabwe, however, that is difficult, because estimating 
the size of the Zimbabwean economy accurately is close to impossible, not only due to a lack of 
data, but also due to the immense size of the informal sector in the country.  Therefore, any 
figures for GDP must be regarded with caution, just as the above estimates of remittance flows.  
Nonetheless, calculating the ratio of remittance inflows to GDP is useful as an indication of the 
importance they have.  The IMF projected Zimbabwe’s nominal GDP for 2009 to be just over 
US$3.5 billion (IMF 2009).  Based on the IMF’s GDP projections, this would mean that 
worldwide remittance flows to Zimbabwe currently amount to 28-40 per cent of Zimbabwe’s 
GDP.  Cash remittances from South Africa alone (excluding in-kind remittances) account for 
roughly 11-15 per cent of GDP.   
In comparison to these figures, only about two dozen or so countries worldwide receive cash 
remittances equal to more than 20 per cent of GDP (IFAD 2007).  In Africa, Eritrea (38 per 
cent), Cape Verde (34 per cent), Liberia (26 per cent), Lesotho (24 per cent), Burundi (23 per 
cent), Gambia (17 per cent) and Mali (12 per cent) record similarly high ratios 36  (ibid:8).  
Zimbabwe stands out in that it has a larger population than most of the countries in this group.  
However, the IMF predicts that if appropriate economic reforms are further consolidated, 
nominal GDP should increase to over US$6 billion by 2013, meaning that even if remittance 
flows stayed stable, they would account for roughly 13-18 per cent of GDP37. 
 
 
                                                          
36 These ratios include an estimate of informal flows, but exclude in-kind transfers. 
37 Including both informal and in-kind transfers. 
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VI. ASSESSING THE KEY DRIVERS OF REMITTANCE FLOWS 
In general, remittances are driven first and foremost by the need to support migrant workers’ 
families.  Straubhaar (1986), for example, showed that the total inflow of remittances to Turkey 
is affected neither by exchange rate variations, nor by changes in the real rate of return on 
investment.  His explanation is that most remitters have little option but to send money, given 
the severe economic hardships faced by their families in the home country.  This seems to be the 
case with Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa, both because of the low income of most 
Zimbabwean migrants and the depth of dependency of remittance recipients in Zimbabwe.  
While subsequent sections analyse the various supply-side constraints to sending remittances 
from South Africa, this section examines to what extent the different characteristics of migrants 
for which survey data was gathered influence those migrants’ remittance sending decisions.  
An initial analysis of the data reveals that a number of factors seem to have implications for the 
remittance sending behaviour and patterns of migrants, including the number of dependants that 
migrants have in Zimbabwe.  For example, respondents that had at least one child in Zimbabwe 
remitted 11 per cent more of their income than respondents without any children in Zimbabwe.  
It seems the more children migrants have in the home country, the more they remit.  For 
example, those respondents with six or more dependants in Zimbabwe remitted 19 per cent 
more as a share of their income on average than respondents with only two or less dependants in 
Zimbabwe.  
The number of children that surveyed migrants had in South Africa was found to be negatively 
correlated with remittance flows, as would be expected.  However, the correlation does not seem 
to be as strong as the aforementioned correlation with dependants in Zimbabwe.  According to 
the survey results, respondents with two or more children in South Africa remitted 6 per cent 
less of their income than those without children in South Africa.  
Another factor that seems to have implications for remittance flows is the duration of time that 
migrants have been in South Africa.  Based on mean values the results seem to indicate that the 
longer the time that migrants spent in South Africa, the lower the share of income that they 
remit.  Those migrants that have spent less than three years in South Africa remitted 8 per cent 
more as a share of their income than those migrants that spent more than three years in South 
Africa.38  This is likely to be attributable to both that the closeness of ties to and responsibility 
                                                          
38 Interestingly, it seems that those respondents that spent less than one year in the country remitted 10 per cent less 
as a share of their income than those who spent between one and three years in the country.  It seems that the 
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for family members in Zimbabwe weakens over time and that the amount of dependants in 
South Africa increases with the amount of time spent abroad.  For example, migrants that have 
been in South Africa for less than three years reported having an average of 0.8 dependants in 
the country, as opposed to 1.4 dependants per migrant that has been in South Africa for longer 
than three years.   
However, neither the likelihood to remit, nor the share of income remitted seem to be 
significantly affected by the other factors for which the survey gathered data, such as the gender 
or age of migrants, the years of schooling completed, whether migrants are from rural or urban 
areas, or even the main reason given for migrating to South Africa.  Neither does the share of 
income remitted seem to be significantly affected by whether the migrant plans on staying in 
South Africa permanently as opposed to temporarily.  For example, those migrants that replied 
‘yes’ to the survey question of whether they plan on returning to Zimbabwe permanently, 
remitted only slightly more as a share of their income (31 %), on average, than those who replied 
‘no’ (29 %).  
A simple multiple regression analysis was used to test the importance and scrutinize the statistical 
significance of this initial analysis of the key explanatory variables on remittance sending 
dynamics.  To determine which variables to include in the regression, a Pearson’s correlation39 
was first employed to test the strength of the correlation of each of the available variables with 
the dependent variable, the share of income remitted (Y_Share)40.  Only three variables had a 
sufficiently strong linear correlation with the share of income remitted and were hence included 
in the regression: (i) the number of dependants the migrant has in Zimbabwe (Dep_Zim); (ii) the 
number of children he/she has in South Africa (Child_SA); and (iii) the length of time (in years) 
that the migrant has been in South Africa (Stay_SA).   
The following equation was estimated: 
Y_SHARE = C(1)+C(2)*(DEP_ZIM)+C(3)*(CHILD_SA)+C(4)*(STAY_SA). 
A priori, it is expected that the relative size of remittances would be directly and positively 
related to the number of dependants in Zimbabwe but inversely or negatively related to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
ability of new migrants to remit is impeded both by the difficulty in finding well-paid work and the ability of 
migrants to save. 
39 See Annex 6 for details. 
40 The share of income remitted was used as the dependent variable instead of the amount of remittances sent, 
because the latter was influenced too heavily by the income of migrants, for which only a gross figure was captured 
by the survey, rather than a figure for disposable income, which would have been more accurate.   
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number of dependants in South Africa and how long the migrant has been in South Africa, as 
the initial analysis above already alluded to. 
TABLE 2: REGRESSION 1 RESULTS 
Sample Observations 1 – 326 
 Coefficient Standard Error Probability 
Constant (C1) 0.2085 0.0276 0 
Dep_Zim (C2) 0.0436 0.0044 0 
Child_SA (C3) -0.0234 0.0118 0.0493 
Stay_SA (C4) -0.0075 0.0033 0.0264 
R-Squared: 0.2516 
Using the least squares method41, the results in table 2 show that the sign of all three variables is 
as anticipated and that all the coefficients are significant.  The coefficient C(2) for Dep_Zim 
means that for every extra dependant in Zimbabwe, the migrant will remit an additional 4.36 per 
cent of their income, and is this highly significant.  The relationship is less strong for the other 
two variables, but the direction of the relationship is as expected.  For example, every extra child 
that the migrant has in South Africa reduces their remittances by 2.34 per cent of their income.  
However, for both this variable and the duration of stay, the coefficients were not as statistically 
significant as for the coefficient for dependants in Zimbabwe.   
Moreover, alongside the relatively low R-squared value (0.25), an indication that there are other 
missing factors that impact the share of income remitted is the fact that the value for the 
constant, C(1), is quite high, at 0.21.  This means that migrants will remit about 21 per cent of 
their income even if all three explanatory variables used here are zero.  The constant seems 
rather high and may be capturing other factors.  In the absence of direct dependants in 
Zimbabwe, the notion that migrants still remit a small share of their income may be due to 
savings or investment objectives of those migrants, for example. 
In order to test the stability of these results throughout the distribution of the observations, it is 
indicative to run the same regression using different groupings of observations42.  As table 3 
below shows, when changing the sample observations to 175-326, the only variable that remains 
statistically significant is the number of dependants in Zimbabwe.  The other two are not 
statistically significant any longer.  
 
 
                                                          
41 The regression was calculated using the statistical program E-views. 
42 The ordering of the observations may inadvertently capture particular groups of people. 
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TABLE 3: REGRESSION 2 RESULTS 
Sample Observations: 175 – 326 
 Coefficient Standard Error Probability 
Constant (C1) 0.2074 0.0362 0 
Dep_Zim (C2) 0.0414 0.0061 0 
Child_SA (C3) -0.0173 0.0160 0.2828 
Stay_SA (C4) -0.0063 0.0044 0.1557 
R-Squared: 0.2589 
This instability in the distribution may be the result of differences in the data from 
Masiphumelele as opposed to De Doorns, which is being reflected in the regression results due 
to the order in which the data were recorded.  It seems that the number of children in South 
Africa and the duration spent in the country is more statistically significant in the sample from 
Masiphumelele than in the sample from De Doorns.   
In order to identify the relative importance of the length of stay in South Africa and the number 
of children in South Africa, a multiplicative and additive interaction term were added in the 
regression.  In this case, the additive term was insignificant whereas the multiplicative term was 
significant, which indicated the relative greater importance of children in South Africa compared 
to the length of stay.43  Finally, to gain an impression of the pure impact of the dependants on 
the share of income remitted, we can exclude the constant from the equation.  The following 
equation captures these changes: 
Y_SHARE = C(2)*(DEP_ZIM) + C(5)*((CHILD_SA)*STAY_SA)) 
TABLE 4: REGRESSION 3 RESULTS 
Sample Observations: 1 – 326 
 Coefficient Standard Error Probability 
Dep_Zim (C2) 0.0726 0.0019 0 
Child_SA*Stay_SA (C5) -0.0039 0.0013 0.0031 
R-Squared: 0.1310 
The equation now indicates that as much as 7.3 percent of migrants’ total income is remitted for 
each dependant in Zimbabwe, which is reduced according to the number of ‘dependant child 
years’ they have in SA.   
The low R-squared values recorded in each of the regressions above make it clear that using 
merely these three explanatory variables is not a full explanation of the variation in the share of 
                                                          
43 The length of stay is always greater than zero, where as the number of children in SA is often equal to zero.  Thus 
the mutiplicative favors the number of children whereas the sum favors the length of stay. 
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their income that migrants remit.  There are three considerations here.  First and foremost, the 
ambiguity in the results point to the fact that remittance behaviour is determined by both 
recipient (‘demand side’) and migrant (‘supply-side’) forces.  Since the survey collected data only 
from Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa, and thus gathered almost no data on the remittance 
recipients in Zimbabwe, it could only account for the supply side of that equation.  More detailed 
information on the characteristics, needs 44  and preference-structures of the corresponding 
remittance recipient households in Zimbabwe would be needed to create a more complete 
explanatory model of remittances behaviour.  
Secondly, the data gathered on the supply side of migrants’ remittance behaviour was not 
detailed enough to capture the complexity of remittance-sending behaviour.  Due to the limited 
scope of the study, there was no data on various factors that could influence remittance-sending 
decisions, for example the relationship of the migrant to each of the various dependants cited 
(i.e. spouse, parents, etc.) 45 .  Clayton and Warin (2010), for instance, in their analysis of 
household survey data from El Salvador and Ecuador, found that the only statistically significant 
relationship is the existence of a spouse in the home country.  Another example of useful data 
that was beyond the scope of this study is the time frame when migrants are planning to return 
to Zimbabwe.  Woodruff and Zenteno (2007), for example, found that Mexican migrants in the 
U.S. that planned to return home soon remitted more.  
Finally, the low R-squared values highlight that he nature of migrants’ remittance behaviour may 
be highly individualistic, based not only on factors such as income, dependants and duration of 
stay, but also on immeasurable ones concerning the different personalities, priorities, objectives 
and even attitudes to altruism of individual migrants.  As a result, remittance behaviour can vary 
greatly from one migrant to the next and no data collection exercise or regression analysis will be 
able to fully capture all the dynamics responsible for variations in remittance-sending patterns.  
In summary, the most important and identifiable factor driving remittances seems to be the 
number of dependants a migrant has in Zimbabwe.  Each dependant could be responsible for an 
estimated 4 to 7 per cent of migrant income.  On average, migrants remitted 31 per cent of their 
income, with a standard error of 20 per cent.  The number of dependants in SA reduced the 
amount of remittances, especially for those that have been in SA for a longer period of time.  
                                                          
44 Information on health issues, including HIV/AIDS, for example, could go a long way in explaining variations in 
remittance-sending behaviour.  
45 The only question in the survey that was more detailed was on the number of children. 
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VII. HIGH RATES OF INFORMALITY 
 
Most corridors outside of Africa have over the past decade undergone a rapid formalisation of 
remittance flows, due to increased competition amongst formal service providers, lower costs 
and better technology that has enabled more efficient and targeted services (World Bank 2009).  
As a result, many more migrants have remittance-sending options that offer greater security and 
faster speed, and remittance flows across the globe are now more transparent and accountable.  
The reasons why this has not been the case in this corridor will be discussed in this section.  
In some corridors, particularly in Africa and in parts of Asia, substantial amounts of remittances 
continue to flow through informal channels.  In Asia, these informal transfer mechanisms often 
go back centuries, such as hawala and hundi in South Asia or fei ch’ien in China.  They are 
extremely efficient and charge low costs46.  Africa, however, not only lacks reliable and cost-
effective informal systems, but has also been largely left behind by the global advance of formal 
channels.    
The objective, hence, should be to encourage the formalisation of remittance flows in the South 
Africa-Zimbabwe corridor.  The current environment in this corridor is promising for this shift, 
due not only to the use of the South African Rand in Zimbabwe, which has helped stimulate a 
trend towards less in-kind and greater pecuniary flows, but also because the drawbacks of 
informal channels are significant and apparent to Zimbabwean migrants.  The potential gains of 
improving the efficiency and reducing the costs of current remittance options seem to be 
significant.  For example, to a question in the survey that asked ‘would you remit more if it 
became easier, cheaper, safer and faster to do so’, 93 per cent replied ‘yes’.   
Yet despite the favourable environment, the high rates of informality in this corridor will not be 
reduced unless a number of constraints to the formalization of remittance flows are addressed.  
The issues and constraints that are responsible for the current predominance of informal 
channels can be divided into four, prioritized sub-sections: (1) the stringent legislative rules and 
regulations in South Africa; (2) the characteristics of both formal and informal channels; (3) the 
large share of in-kind remittance flows; and (4) the lack of financial literacy of Zimbabwean 
migrants.   
 
 
                                                          
46 For details, see annex 7.  
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LEGALITY AND REGULATIONS 
The high rates of informality in the South Africa-Zimbabwe remittance corridor can be 
explained first and foremost by the legislative rules and regulations in South Africa.  There are 
three pieces of legislation that pose obstacles to the flow of remittances: exchange control 
legislation, anti-money laundering (AML) and combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) 
regulation, and immigration law.  Firstly, exchange control legislation is not problematic because 
of the limits it sets on amounts transferred cross-border, since most remittances are small 
amounts, but because it regulates who is allowed to deal in foreign exchange and via what 
mechanisms.  In practice, it creates a significant barrier to entry for potential new players in the 
market.  As it stands now, only authorised dealers, who must have both a banking license and 
have made an investment in an expensive exchange control reporting system, can remit funds 
(Genesis 2005).  As a result of this legislation, for example, money transfer operators (MTOs) 
cannot operate independently, but must instead partner with a bank.  This gives banks and 
MTOs a de facto monopoly of formal remittance transactions, and sets the stage for the inflated 
costs of transactions.  
Secondly, South Africa is committed to complying with international AML and CFT regulations.  
In doing so, it has implemented rules such as ‘know-your-customer’ legislation.  This regulation 
dictates the need for an applicant to have formal proof of residence, as well as proof of the 
source of funds in order to have access to financial services.  Most migrants live in informal 
settlements and are paid in cash, as the survey results indicate, and therefore find it hard to 
‘prove’ their residence or where their income came from.  The result is that all undocumented 
migrants, and many documented ones working in cash jobs, are excluded from access to 
financial services.  
The third piece of legislation that impacts remittance flows in the South Africa-Zimbabwe 
corridor is immigration laws.  Currently, there are almost no legal options available to unskilled 
individuals wishing to migrate to South Africa.  The only choice that migrants have is to apply 
for asylum and obtain refugee status.  In almost all cases, however, applications are rejected47, 
because they are arguably made on economic or humanitarian grounds, rather than on proven 
grounds of individual or political persecution, as the 1998 Refugees Act stipulates.  Once the 
right of appeal is exhausted, migrants have to leave, but most choose to remain illegally.   
                                                          
47 A background note by the FSMP in 2007 cited that of the 44,000 Zimbabwean asylum applications that had been 
filed to that date, only around 1,000 were granted (FSMP 2007). 
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As became clear from the focus group discussions, the majority of participants explained that 
they did not bother applying for refugee status in the first place, because of the difficulties in the 
application process.  Since the demand vastly exceeds the resources and capacities of the Home 
Affairs’ refugee reception centres, just submitting an application often becomes a frustrating 
process.  Some focus group participants explained that they spent days on end queuing outside 
the reception centre, sleeping on the sidewalk at night, only to be forced to give up eventually in 
many cases.  Because most migrants have no savings and live from their weekly earnings, focus 
group participants explained that they cannot afford to spend so much time waiting in line rather 
than working.  In some extreme cases, migrants have starved to death outside the refugee 
reception centre in Cape Town48.  Fortunately, a new refugee reception centre was opened in 
Cape Town in late 2009, which has increased the efficiency of the process somewhat. 
As a final note concerning the prevalence of undocumented Zimbabwean migration, many 
migrants choose to border jump because they cannot afford obtaining a passport in Zimbabwe, 
which costs between one and two hundred US dollars.  As a result of this and the 
aforementioned factors, the great majority of migration is undocumented.  As just explained, 
without proof of legal residence it is very difficult to access the formal financial system.  
Hence, the direct result of these legislative rules and regulations are both a lack of accessibility to 
formal channels and excessively high costs of formal transfers from South Africa to Zimbabwe 
and elsewhere abroad.  Before turning to the other three areas that currently impede the 
formalization of flows, it is useful to highlight the cost of remittance transfers in this corridor 
that are in a large degree the result of these legality and regulatory issues. 
 
COST OF REMITTANCE TRANSFERS 
 
South-South remittance costs are higher than North-South transfers (Beck and Peria 2009).  
South-South formal remittance transfers are often either impossible due to capital and exchange 
controls, or they are extremely expensive because currency conversion charges have to be paid at 
both ends (ibid).  On a global scale, remittance costs have been declining over the past decade, 
but have remained sticky most recently (World Bank 2009).   
Beck and Peria (2009) find that corridors with larger numbers of migrants and more competition 
among remittance service providers exhibit lower costs, whereas corridors which have greater 
share of bank participation in the market have higher remittance costs, on average.  Based on the 
large number of migrants, the close proximity and low share of bank participation, one would 
                                                          
48 Interview with Braam Hanekom, chairman of PASSOP. 
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assume that the South Africa-Zimbabwe remittance corridor would be among the cheapest.  
This is far from being the case.  Average remittance costs worldwide fall in the region of 10 per 
cent, with efficient corridors commonly recording fees around 5 per cent.  In contrast, the 
average cost of remitting money from South Africa to Zimbabwe is closer to 14 per cent49.    
The high cost of remitting from South Africa to Zimbabwe is not primarily due to restrictions or 
inefficiencies in Zimbabwe, but rather due to a set of interconnected factors in South Africa.  
This is validated by the fact that remittance-sending costs from South Africa to all other SADC 
countries, with the exception of Swaziland and Lesotho, are even higher than the costs of 
sending remittances to Zimbabwe (Beck and Peria 2009).  To Malawi and Zambia, for example, 
average costs are close to 18 per cent, while remittance transfers from South Africa to Botswana 
and Mozambique also cost above 15 per cent, on average (ibid).  The following table displays the 
costs of formal transmission channels for various amounts remitted from South Africa to 
Zimbabwe. 
TABLE 5: COST COMPARISON OF FORMAL REMITTANCE CHANNELS 
Value Remitted R250 R500 R1000 R2000 
 Charge Fee Charge Fee Charge Fee Charge Fee 
Bank Transfer50 R 187 75.0 % R 187 37.5% R187 18.7% R187 9.4% 
MTO51 R 90 36.0 % R 104 20.8% R128 12.8% R171 8.5% 
Postal Order R 22 8.8 % R 27 5.5% R32.50 3.3% R37.20 1.9% 
Source: Bank and Postal Office Staff 
As is displayed in the table above, both banks and MTOs are not competitive options if the 
value remitted is small, usually anything less than R1500.  The reason for the high fees is that 
both banks and MTOs charge a minimum ‘swift’ fee, no matter what the size of the transaction, 
before adding a commission rate, usually around four per cent.  The result is that for small 
transfers, as remittance flows usually are52, the cost of using an official electronic transfer is often 
above 20 per cent.  As there are few service providers that participate in the market, and banking 
services are not usually targeted towards lower-income individuals, it is no wonder, then, that 
even the documented Zimbabwean migrants with access to these formal channels choose not to 
use this option, and instead opt largely for the informal channels.  
Costs of informal channels are, however, not much lower than those of formal channels.  
According to the results of the survey, the average cost of remitting R1000 using informal 
channels was 12.3 per cent (as opposed to 14 per cent for formal channels).  Surveyed migrants 
                                                          
49 World Bank website: www.remittanceprices.org; and confirmed by survey results.  
50 Calculated the average fees of four banks: FNB, ABSA, Nedbank and Standard Bank. 
51 Calculated the average fees charged by the two providers, Money Gram and Western Union.  
52 The average remittance transaction was worth close to R1200.  
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indicated that private transporters, such as bus drivers, charged an average fee of R145 per 
R1000 of cash and goods remitted, or 14.5 per cent.  Moreover, even when migrants give the 
money and goods to their friends and relatives that are travelling back, they are charged an 
average of 8.6 per cent.  Unofficial MTOs on average charge slightly less than Money Gram and 
Western Union, the two official MTOs in the market, at 12.8 per cent.  The graph below 
summarises the costs of all major remittance channels in the corridor. 
GRAPH 5: COST OF REMITTANCE CHANNELS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
From a cost perspective, the only viable formal remittance option is the postal order.  The costs 
of these are very low, even for smaller transactions around R500, as Table 5 above shows.  
Moreover, they usually only take about a week to arrive in Zimbabwe, and the recipient can cash 
the cheque at the post office branch in Zimbabwe in South African Rand.  Furthermore, post 
offices have a far greater geographic reach than banks or MTOs and thus offer a significant 
potential in terms of accessibility that can rival informal services. 
However, there are three main reasons why only about 7 per cent of surveyed migrants indicated 
that they remit using postal orders.  Firstly, postal orders suffer from a lack of reliability, such as 
time delays or theft.  Because of this insecurity, post office staff in South Africa have in some 
cases even discouraged the sending of postal orders to Zimbabwe (Kerzner 2009).  Secondly, the 
Zimbabwean Postal Service, Zimpost, is inefficient in that it still uses an outdated paper based 
system and that payment systems are not harmonized in many cases.  And thirdly, there is a lack 
of financial awareness amongst migrants, in that many are unaware of the availability and cost-
efficiency of postal orders.  Nonetheless, if these weaknesses are addressed and postal services in 
Zimbabwe modernized, they offer a large potential for future remittance flows. 
0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18% 20% 
Friends/Relatives 
Transporter/Bus Driver 
Unofficial MTO 
Postal Order 
Official MTO 
Bank Transfer 
Average Fee for R1000 Transfer 
Average Fees per R1000 sent to Zimbabwe 
51 
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF REMITTANCE CHANNELS 
Beyond issues concerning legality and regulations, informal channels dominate because they tend 
to be better aligned to the circumstances of both the migrant and remittance recipients.  Hence, 
even if the migrant can provide both proof of legal residence and transfer high enough sums to 
make using formal channels financially feasible, he/she often still chooses informal channels.  
For example, many of the migrants come from rural areas where there is often an absence of 
banks in the proximity of the remittance receiver.  One fifth of respondents in this sample said 
there was no bank in the vicinity of the remittance recipients.  Hence, the cost involved in 
travelling to the closest bank to draw the money out can make these formal channels even more 
expensive than they already are.  Formal channels were even more unappealing in the past when 
taking into account that banks in Zimbabwe sometimes imposed quotas on how much money 
can be drawn out at a time.  In contrast to this, informal channels are far better suited to the 
needs of migrants, in many cases delivering the remittances right to the doorstep of recipients. 
Hence, informal channels make up the predominant share of remittance flows because they 
better address the realities that migrants face, and are thereby simply more convenient to use.  
Indeed, in the survey sample, the majority of respondents, 41 per cent, cited convenience and the 
ease of the process as their principal reason for choosing the channel that they did.  The second 
most common cited reason was the cost, at 29 per cent.  Safety and reliability (18 per cent) and 
the speed of the transfer (10 per cent) were the other options that seemed to be less prioritized.  
Moreover, of those that cited convenience as their main reason for their chosen remittance 
channel, 94 per cent used informal channels. 
However, informal channels are subject to significant market inefficiencies and impediments.  A 
high number of respondents that used informal channels, 84 per cent, said that they had at least 
once in the past had negative experiences with using informal channels.  Most commonly, 
complaints included the theft of money, the breaking or loss of goods and the long time it takes 
for the remittances to arrive.  Another often-noted complaint raised in the focus group 
discussions was the common practice of transporters and bus drivers to convert the South 
African Rand they are given into US Dollars before paying the recipients in US Dollars.  Indeed, 
this sort of dishonesty is prevalent in many different forms.  One focus group participant even 
explained that he sent a new flat screen LCD TV to his family in Zimbabwe with a transporter 
last year, who delivered a different, much older TV that could only display black and white 
images.   
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It comes as no surprise therefore, that of those survey respondents that cited safety and 
reliability as their key concern, only 7 per cent chose to remit using transporters or bus drivers, 
while the majority chose either to give it to friends or relatives or to use formal channels.  
Unfortunately, even many of those who chose to remit by giving cash and goods to friends or 
relatives reported that cash or goods often went missing.   
The effect of this kind of dishonesty and inefficiency is that it inflates the real cost of remitting 
using informal channels.  Informal sector costs are already high, in large degree because of the 
additional ‘transaction costs’ imposed on transporters in the form of bribes and increasing fees 
charged at the border, on both the South African and Zimbabwean sides.  Indeed, high money-
transfer costs negatively influence and mitigate the development impact of these financial flows 
(IOM 2005).  As is apparent, the remittance options that Zimbabwean migrants are faced with 
are either extremely expensive or excessively risky, and hence, thorough changes are much 
needed.  
THE NATURE OF REMITTANCE FLOWS 
The shift towards a formalization of remittance flows is further impeded by the large share of 
overall remittance flows that is made up of in-kind transfers, which creates a bias towards 
informal remittance channels.  Since goods are remitted almost exclusively using informal 
channels such as bus drivers, transporters or friends and relatives, the high number of migrants 
that make in-kind transfers are providing a continuous impetus for using the same informal 
channels for making cash transactions too.  The focus group discussions supported this 
hypothesis, with many participants explaining that it is more convenient to simply include an 
envelope of cash in a box of goods, rather than making a separate transaction for the cash alone. 
THE FINANCIAL LITERACY OF MIGRANTS 
This argument is further accentuated by the lack of financial awareness amongst Zimbabwean 
migrants that prohibits the greater use of formal channels.  It seems that the majority of 
Zimbabwean migrants do not fully understand the various options that they have to transmit 
money and goods to their families.  Again, this became apparent during the three different focus 
group discussions, in all of which hardly any of the participants had a clear understanding of the 
different remittance-sending options, and the processes and costs involved in each.  As such, 
they often assumed that they had no access to MTOs or did not know that they could send 
money through postal orders, and thus resorted to informal channels because they felt they had 
no other options. 
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VIII. POTENTIAL GAINS OF FORMALIZATION 
Using data that was gathered by the survey and comparing figures to data gathered in other, 
more developed remittance corridors, the potential impact of greater competition, accessibility 
and lower costs of formal channels on remittance flows can be estimated.  For example, if 
average costs of remittance transfers fell from the current 10-15 per cent to rates charged in 
many other remittance corridors, an estimated additional US$ 54-72 million53 annually would 
flow directly into the incomes of Zimbabwean households from migrants in South Africa, 
assuming the volume of flows remain constant. 
A decrease in the costs of transfers would be unlikely to increase the overall volume of 
remittance flows significantly, because the majority Zimbabwean migrants already seem to be 
remitting as much as they can afford.  Instead, the impact of decreasing costs and increasing the 
accessibility of formal channels would primarily be manifested in a greater shift towards formal 
channels, and away from the current predominance of informal channels.  Indeed, the notion 
that remittance flows do not seem to be significantly dependent on the costs of transfers was 
indicated by the weak correlation between the two variables.  It seems that Boon’s (2006) 
aforementioned findings hold true in this remittance corridor.   
Perhaps contrary to initial impression, it is in the interest of the South African government to 
facilitate the formalization of remittance flows.  As a result of a widespread formalization of 
flows, potentially hundreds of millions of US Dollars every year could become more transparent, 
which is important for effective policy-making.  Secondly, a formalization of flows could 
increase the efficiency of the financial sector and further stimulate its development.  If a greater 
volume of flows were captured by formal channels, the financial sector would benefit through 
increased liquidity and a greater stock of funds available for banks to on-lend.   
The gains of a formalization of flows are apparent not just for South Africa’s financial sector, but 
also for Zimbabwe’s development objectives.  For example, although the lions’ share of 
remittances in developing countries is used for consumption, a significant amount is available for 
savings or investment (IFAD 2008).  This is confirmed to an extent by this survey, with 40 per 
cent of respondents said that recipients save at least 10 per cent of remittances, and 16 per cent 
said their relatives saved at least 20 per cent54.  At present, however, when recipients do save, 
                                                          
53 Assuming the current average cost of 13 per cent would be reduced to 5 per cent, and taking both the lower 
bound (US$ 680 million) and upper bound (US$ 905 million) estimates for annual remittance flows from South 
Africa.   
54 See annex 9 for details of the survey results on remittance utilization. 
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they often do not use formal channels to do so.  Bringing these funds55 into the formal financial 
system can greatly increase their developmental impacts for Zimbabwe.  
A parallel can be drawn to the U.S.-Mexico remittance corridor, from which important lessons 
can be learned.  Within less than a decade 56  the corridor transformed from predominantly 
informal transfers, to about 85 per cent formal remittance transfers (Hernandez-Coss 2005).  
The primary reason for this shift was that Mexican migrants had better access to formal 
mechanisms, primarily due to the Matricula Consular system, which enables Mexican migrants, 
even those who entered illegally, to gain access to financial services on presentation of a so-called 
Matricula identification card.  “The use of Matricula Consular identification to access financial 
services, combined with higher levels of financial education among migrants” played a big role in 
this shift, alongside “increased competition, technological change, and product innovations that 
have created a more competitive market” (ibid, p.37).  The result of increased competition and 
adoption of new technologies has also been a steady decline in prices and increasing efficiency of 
transfer mechanisms (ibid).  For example, the cost of sending $300 from the U.S. to Mexico 
declined by nearly 60 per cent between 1999 and 2005 (World Bank 2006, p.139).   
The example of the U.S.-Mexico remittance corridor should therefore be replicated in the case of 
the South Africa-Zimbabwe corridor.  Given that appropriate changes are made and that formal 
channels become a viable alternative to informal channels, they could rival and then overtake 
informal transfers.  Globally, for example, Freund and Spatafora (2005) found that informal 
remittances on average account for about 35-75 percent of official flows.   The next section 
discusses the various policy implications of realising this shift towards a formalization of 
remittance flows. 
 
IX. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
The key policy implication of these findings is the necessity to facilitate fast and secure money 
transfers from migrants in South Africa in order to develop remittances flows to standards and 
levels comparable to Latin America or South Asia.  The ultimate goal in doing so is to move 
towards a formal remittance sending market that is accessible, quick, reliable, offers competitive 
prices and has geographic reach.  In order to achieve this, two key issues should be addressed: 
                                                          
55 In Zimbabwe, they are likely to amount to close to US$ 100 million annually, given that survey results indicate 
that between 7-15 per cent is saved, and assuming that overall remittance flows are between US$ 1-1.5 billion. 
56 From approximately 1996-2003. 
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increasing the efficiency of the formal remittance service market, primarily by encouraging 
greater competition, and increasing the accessibility and geographic reach of formal remittance 
channels. 
POLICY OPTIONS TO TARGET INEFFICIENCIES 
At present, remittance transfers from South Africa are affected by regulations that are excessive, 
unclear, unsystematic and not harmonized.  This is causing significant inefficiencies in the South 
Africa remittance-sending market.  According to a study by Genesis Analytics (2005), the 
remittance channels that offer the greatest potential revenues are also those that presently face 
the greatest number of regulatory barriers.  The main finding of the report is that “unless the 
regulatory regime is modified it is unlikely that the remittance market can be formalised or that 
new entrants will take advantage of the considerable revenue streams that are available” (ibid, 
p.xvi).  Strengthening the efficiency of the formal remittance market would have a number of 
positive impacts, including that it would increase the disposable incomes of poor migrants, boost 
incentives to remit more and further encourage the use of formal remittance channels.   
There are a number of options through which to promote formal remittance flows.  The first 
concerns exchange control legislation, which is an area for large potential efficiency gains.  For 
example, at present, all foreign exchange transactions must be reported to the South African 
Reserve Bank (SARB), which increases the cost of each transaction.  As such, policy-makers 
should assess the feasibility of removing exchange control reporting requirements for 
transactions below a R2000 threshold.  Putting in place a minimum floor on transactions should 
not pose balance of payments risks and hence, a minimum threshold could cut the costs without 
any foreseeable adverse effects.  More generally, the efficiency of the SARB and the private 
banking sector could be strengthened.   
Another reason why exchange control legislation is problematic is because it creates a significant 
barrier to entry for potential new market players.  As mentioned above, due to the current 
restrictions, authorised dealer licenses are only issued to banks, and limited ones to bureaux de 
change, which stifles competition.  This situation impedes the South African government’s 
objective of becoming the central financial hub for Africa.  In order for this objective to be 
realised, there must be an effective and competitive market for all types of financial transactions.  
In order to encourage competition in the remittance market, an option would be to introduce a 
targeted and limited authorised dealer license for such transactions.  The primary objective of 
this would be to increase the number of official MTOs.  Another tool to encourage the entry of 
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new players that has been tried and tested elsewhere is to decrease and harmonize bond and 
capital requirements for starting up MTOs (Ratha 2007).   
There is no guarantee that the regulations and incentives that worked in other parts of the world 
will work in this corridor.  Nonetheless, these options should be assessed thoroughly, and if 
found to be feasible, they could have the potential to increase the number of service providers, 
push down the costs and increase the quality of the services offered.  Internationally, banks 
usually charge lower fees than money transfer operators; this should be an objective for this 
corridor too.  Increasing the efficiency of the formal remittance market is in itself however not 
enough to ensure a formalization of flows.  
POLICY OPTIONS TO INCREASE ACCESSIBILITY 
In addition to increasing the efficiency of the formal sector, the second key requirement is to 
increase the financial access of migrants to these channels.  In this regard, the stringent rules 
imposed in South Africa to comply with international AML and CFT regulations, such as ‘know-
your-customer’ legislation, exclude not only all undocumented migrants from using formal 
channels, but also the majority of documented migrants in cash jobs.  As mentioned above, it 
must be kept in mind that of all major remittance sending countries, South Africa not only has 
the lowest GDP per capita, but also has the highest share of inhabitants living in rural areas.  
Against this background, the necessary paper trails for such legislation are often absent in poorer 
communities, rendering the current AML and CFT regulations somewhat ineffectual.  At least in 
regards to remittance flows, the main outcome of certain aspects of this legislation is simply to 
drive financial flows further underground, whilst excluding the poor from accessing financial 
services.   
One part of this legislation that, if relaxed, has the potential for increasing the accessibility of 
formal channels, is know-your-customer legislation.  A large part of the current inefficiency 
comes from the requirement of proof of residence and proof of source of funds in order to 
remit using formal channels.  If formal remittance transactions are enabled upon the 
presentation of a passport or special ID document alone, it could have considerable positive 
impacts.  This has been tried and worked successfully in the US approach to Mexican migrants, 
as mentioned above.  However, such a reform must be approached cautiously because there is 
no guarantee that a similar system would be successful in South Africa simply because it worked 
in the United States.  Moreover, if such a reform were to be implemented, there must of course 
be safeguards that data is protected and will not be used by immigration authorities for 
prosecution.  
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Another area of legislation that could be addressed in order to increase the accessibility of 
migrants to formal channels is South African immigration law.  As discussed above, immigration 
law is currently extremely restrictive towards unskilled immigrants.  Acknowledging the 
unprecedented scale of Zimbabwean immigration and the fact that it is unlikely to change 
anytime soon, however, several positive changes were implemented in May 2009 by the 
Department of Home Affairs, including a free 90-day visa for Zimbabweans and a moratorium 
on the deportation of Zimbabwean nationals.57  The rationale behind the 90-day visa is to try to 
ease the current pressure on refugee reception centres, where asylum applications are lodged.  As 
mentioned above, due to the huge demand for asylum applications, the system is backlogged for 
years.   
Although the 90-day visa is a step in the right direction, it is far from enough to deal with the 
task at hand and it has several drawbacks.  First and foremost, because it needs to be stamped 
into the migrant’s passport, it remains inaccessible to many migrants that cannot afford a 
Zimbabwean passport.  Secondly, many Zimbabwean migrants do not earn enough to afford to 
travel back to Zimbabwe as often as two times a year to renew their visa.  For them, it is much 
easier to either work illegally or apply for refugee status at a refugee reception centre, and then 
work legally in the country while their application is pending in the backlogged system, usually 
for well over a year. 
The most crucial reform announced in April 2009 by the Department of Home Affairs that 
would circumvent these drawbacks and make serious inroads into tackling the problem areas was 
a so-called special dispensation permit for Zimbabwean migrants.  The permit, designed 
specifically for Zimbabwean migrants, would grant migrants the ability to live, work legally and 
have access to basic health care and education in South Africa for a period of six months.  It 
would be renewed automatically at the end of the six months, unless the economic climate in 
Zimbabwe improved significantly.  Migrants without official documents would not be excluded 
from applying either; they would simply have to undergo a so-called ‘nationality test’.   
Despite the continuous inflow of Zimbabwean migrants since then, however, the 
implementation of this permit has been put on hold since the election of the new government in 
2009 and the resulting reshuffling of the cabinet.  It seems there is currently a lack of political 
backing to push through the reform.  Implementing the special dispensation permit for 
Zimbabweans would be a good first step towards controlling the movement of people between 
                                                          
57 The free 90-day visa allows migrants to work legally in the country, and can be renewed once at the end of the 90 
days, for a fee of R425.  After it has run out a second time, migrants need to leave South Africa, and can re-enter 
and get a new free 90-day visa.   
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the two countries and provide a viable alternative for the majority of Zimbabwean economic 
migrants who currently have no other option but to apply for refugee status or simply work and 
live illegally in South Africa.   
Beyond reforming the existing legislative rules and regulations, there are several promising 
options to increase the financial access of migrants.  The first is establishing partnerships 
between remittance service providers and existing postal and other retail networks.  Indeed, 
postal offices have the most reach geographically, and thus present a large, currently untapped 
potential.  Recently, such partnerships with Zimpost have begun emerging, although they are still 
quite limited.  Such partnerships have been tried in parts of West Africa and have had positive 
outcomes and provided some useful lessons.  For example, it is crucial that the partnerships are 
non-exclusive, in order to avoid monopolization that would likely have adverse effects on costs.  
In other words, all registered MTOs should have access to the postal office branches.  A similar 
concept has already been launched by some retail stores in South Africa, that allow migrants to 
purchase goods in one branch in Cape Town, send the receipt number to the recipient, who can 
then pick up the goods at a store branch where he/she is.  This type of innovative development 
must be further pursued and expanded. 
The use of new technologies is allowing many formal service providers in other corridors to 
lower the costs of transfers, while at the same time improving the efficiency, speed, security and 
outreach to clients.  One such example is mobile phone banking, which operates through 
partnerships between banks, cell phone companies and retailers58.   Some countries, like the 
Philippines, have been very successful in increasing financial access by leveraging remittance 
transfers through the use of mobile phone banking (Ratha and Riedberg 2005).59  In Africa, this 
development is still in its early stages, but has already been implemented in some countries, such 
as Kenya and the Democratic Republic of Congo.  In South Africa, the mobile phone service 
provider MTN is on the verge of launching a similar product.   
Another promising opportunity that has been successful in some developing countries are so-
called smart or pre-paid debit cards.  These can be bought in shops or online and sent to 
recipients, who can then withdraw money from ATMs without needing a bank account.  
Migrants from Mexico, for example, have access to this type of service.  Some banks provide a 
second card to give to someone else.  Both with this service and the mobile phone banking, 
                                                          
58 A number of online retailers, most of them based in the UK, have sprung up in recent years offering remittances 
services using mobile phone technology.  Examples of websites offering services to Zimbabwe include: Siyabonga, 
YesZim, Zimbuyer, Zimland and Mukuru.  Their market share in South Africa is, however, minimal. 
59 See annex 8 for a more detailed description of how the system in the Philippines works.  
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however, certain prerequisites have to be met.  The telecommunications infrastructure, ATM 
penetration and the degree of financial and technological know-how of migrants all impacts the 
accessibility of both migrants and recipients.  
The ability to expand these kinds of services, however, depends on institutions’ capacity, their 
willingness to offer services to people with a low income, and on a regulatory framework that 
encourages them to do so.  In this regard, progressive thinkers at the World Bank and Harvard’s 
Centre for International Development have lead the search to find ways to harness, direct or 
‘leverage’ remittance flows to developing countries around the world in order to maximize their 
potential impact on sustainable development.  Although very recent, the push in this area of 
leveraging remittances for development offers great potential for further research, particularly as 
pertains to the reconstruction and development process in Zimbabwe.  Such an analysis is 
however beyond the scope of this paper.   
As this discussion has made clear, the development potential of remittances in the South Africa-
Zimbabwe corridor is far from being fully exploited.  This is largely because there is still no 
proactive policy to influence the flow and impact of remittances from undocumented migrants 
working in South Africa.  A similar conclusion was reached by Kerzner (2009): “there has been 
no attempt to develop an environment that would encourage the flow of remittances and their 
use in investment” (p.132). 
 
X. CONCLUSION 
 
In general, less is known about remittances to Africa than any other developing region of the 
world.  There is both an acute shortage of reliable sources of data and a lack of consensus on the 
definition of remittances.  As a result, research in the field of remittances has long been confined 
to cash transfers made through formal channels.  This paper has noted that the problem with 
this lies not only with the fact that a large share of remittance flows are in-kind, but also that 
informal, rather than formal transfers make up the lions’ share of remittance flows in Sub-
Saharan Africa in general, and in the South Africa-Zimbabwe remittance corridor in particular. 
This paper has used a survey of Zimbabwean migrants in the Western Cape to gain insight into 
the remittance-sending behaviour and patterns of migrants in the South Africa-Zimbabwe 
remittance corridor.  The survey results highlight that the vast majority of migrants send 
remittances and that the average share of total income remitted is over 30 per cent; a finding that 
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is higher than in most other remittance corridors.  Total remittance flows from Zimbabwean 
migrants in South Africa are estimated to have amounted to between US$680-905 million last 
year, with overall remittance flows to the country likely to be between US$1-1.5 billion annually.  
This sheds some light on both the nature of Zimbabwean migration to South Africa, being 
predominantly temporary and for economic ends, as well as on the depth of remittance-
dependence in Zimbabwe.   
Moreover, the paper made a modest attempt to examine the various drivers of remittance flows, 
despite data limitations.  Of the data that was available, the most significant driver of the share of 
income remitted was found to be the number of dependants in Zimbabwe.  The existence of 
children in South Africa and the duration of stay abroad were both negatively correlated with 
remittances sent, as would be expected.  Other factors, such as the cost of remittance transfers, 
the gender or age of migrants, the years of schooling completed or whether migrants are from 
rural or urban areas were not found to significantly impact the share of income that migrants 
remit.  It was noted that remittance sending decisions are influenced by factors at both the 
migrant and the recipient end, and since the survey gathered only data on the former, its 
explanatory power was limited.  
Despite the large volume of remittance flows and the importance they undoubtedly have in 
many Zimbabwean households, there are considerable constraints and market inefficiencies in 
South Africa that not only drive up the costs of transfers, but more importantly, limit the 
accessibility of formal remittance channels for the majority of migrants.  As a result, over 80 per 
cent of remittance flows from South Africa to Zimbabwe are made using informal channels, 
despite the inefficiency, unreliability and high costs of these channels.  This is having adverse 
effects on both the nature of remittance flows to Zimbabwe and the volume that reaches 
recipients, thereby denying Zimbabweans of their full development potential.   
The survey results also found that a large but falling proportion of overall remittance flows in the 
corridor are in-kind, which is primarily attributable to the conditions faced and preferences of 
remittance recipients rather than those of the migrants.  Due to the predicted gradual economic 
recovery in Zimbabwe, flows are likely to continue evolving more and more towards monetary 
transactions.  This trend is likely to give some momentum to the formalization of remittance 
flows, if these are made more accessible and efficient.  Particularly MTOs, if competition is 
increased, and postal services, if reliability is strengthened, offer the greatest potential.  
Numerous innovative developments such as cell phone banking are likely to be the way of the 
future, although a more detailed examination of these was beyond the scope of this study.  
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What is clear is that if the development gains for Zimbabwe are to be maximised, and the burden 
of immigration eased for South Africa, then the formalization of remittance flows has to be the 
primary objective of any reform.  This will only be achieved if costs are reduced and barriers 
minimized, as well as that flows are facilitated and stimulated by providing the appropriate 
channels, financial education and effective incentives.  If this is done comprehensively, 
remittances may expand their potential and play an invaluable role in the reconstruction of the 
Zimbabwean economy. 
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XII. ANNEXES 
ANNEX 1. DIFFICULTIES AND METHODS IN MEASURING OFFICIAL REMITTANCE FLOWS 
Calculating remittance flows is often more of an art than a science.  Although it is widely 
acknowledged that global remittance flows from the roughly 200 million migrants to their home 
countries are increasing, accurate estimates of country-to-country flows are in most cases not 
available.  Officially reported statistics underestimate total flows and suffer from inconsistencies 
that make disaggregation or comparative analysis difficult.  Case studies and primary data 
collection exercises often use different approaches and make up only a loose patchwork of data.  
As a result, any methodology that attempts to estimate overall remittance flows will resort to 
extrapolations that are based on assumptions, wherever data are non-existent, insufficient or 
unreliable. 
The IMF Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook recorded until 2006 three main streams of 
monetary transfers: workers' remittances, compensation of employees, and migrant transfers. 
Workers' remittances are private transfers from migrant workers who are residents for less than 
1 year in the host country; compensation of employees refers to the entire labour income earned 
by residents who stay in the host country for less than 1 year; and migrant transfers are capital 
transfers from one country to another at the time of migration (less than 1 year).  Unfortunately, 
these definitions allowed for significant loop holes and a lack of clarity, and as a result, research 
that used official BOP data is often weakened by the imprecise and incomplete data.   
Several changes have occurred in the last several years that aim to address these shortfalls.  First, 
in 2006, the United Nations Technical Subgroup on Movement of Persons – Mode Four, and 
the IMF Committee on Balance of Payments Statistics, both known as the “Luxembourg 
Group”, agreed on four new items to be included in the Balance of Payments Manual to define 
remittances: personal transfers, personal remittances, total remittances and total remittances and 
transfers to non-profit institutions serving households.  
Most recently, in 2009, in response to the low quality of remittance data, the IMF and the 
Luxembourg Group created a guide for the compilation of remittances entitled, International 
Transactions in Remittances: Guide for Compilers and Users (RCG).  The lacking quality of remittances 
data prompted the G-8 Heads of State to call for improvements to be made.  As a result, the 
sixth edition of the Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (BPM6) addressed 
the definitional issues, while the RCG addresses the need for practical compilation guidance to 
improve the quality of estimates.   
 
ANNEX 2. SECURITIZATION OF REMITTANCE FLOWS 
Remittance securitization typically involves the borrowing entity (such as a bank) pledging 
its future remittance receivables to an offshore special purpose vehicle (SPV).  The SPV 
issues the debt.  Designated correspondent banks are directed to channel remittance flows 
of the borrowing bank through an offshore collection account managed by a trustee.  The 
collection agent makes principal and interest payments to the investors and sends excess 
collections to the borrowing bank.  Since remittances do not enter the issuer’s home 
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country, the rating agencies believe that the structure mitigates the usual sovereign transfer 
and convertibility risks.   
By mitigating currency convertibility risk, a key component of sovereign risk, the future 
flow securitization structure allows securities to be rated better than the sovereign credit 
rating.  These securities are typically structured to obtain an investment grade rating.  In 
the case of El Salvador, for example, the remittance-backed securities were rated 
investment grade, two to four notches above the sub-investment grade sovereign rating.  
Investment-grade rating makes these transactions attractive to a wider range of “buy-and-
hold” investors (for example, insurance companies) that face limitations on buying sub-
investment grade. As a result, the issuer can access international capital markets at a lower 
interest rate spread and longer maturity. Moreover, by establishing a credit history for the 
borrower, these deals enhance the ability and reduce the costs of accessing capital markets 
in the future. 
Excerpt taken from World Bank (2006), p. 101 
 
 
ANNEX 3. SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS FOR ZIMBABWE, 2007-2009 
 2007 (Est.) 2008 (Est.) 2009 (Proj.) 
Real GDP growth (annual percent change) -6.9 -14.1 2.8 
Nominal GDP (US$ millions) 3,553 3,180 3,498 
Inflation (annual percent change)      
     Consumer price inflation (annual average) 10,453 5.56E+10 6.9 
Central government (percent of GDP, in US$)    
     Revenue 5.7 4.2 25.2 
     Expenditure and net lending 10.8 8.1 35.7 
     Quasi-fiscal activity by RBZ 22.9 35.7 0.0 
Money and credit (US$ millions)    
     Broad money 603 314 513 
External trade (US$ million; annual % change)    
     Exports 4.8 -8.5 -8.1 
     Imports -3.8 24.4 0.4 
Balance of Payments (US$ millions)    
     Exports 1,804 1,651 1,518 
     Imports -2,113 -2,630 -2,641 
     Current account balance (excl. official transfers) -383 -906 -666 
          (As a percent of GDP) -10.8 -28.5 -19.1 
     Overall balance -647 -612 -1,090 
Official reserves    
     Gross official reserves (US$ million; end-of-period) 58.0 5.8 5.8 
Debt    
     Total external debt (US$ millions; end-of-period) 5,285 6,027 6,719 
     Total external debt (percent of GDP; end-of-period) 149 189 192 
Sources: Zimbabwean authorities; IMF staff estimates and projections. 
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ANNEX 4. ZIMBABWE: MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS 
 1990 1995 Latest data Target  
Goal 1 – Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger     
     Poverty headcount ... 55.0 63.0 (2003) 12.9 
     Undernourished people (% of total population) 43.0 44.0 45.0 (2004) 21.5 
     Underweight children under 5 (percent) 11.5 15.5 17.0 (2003) 5.8 
     Share of poorest 20 percent in national income ... 4.6 4.6 (1995) ... 
Goal 2 – Achieve universal primary education     
     Net school enrolment, primary (percent) 84.1 ... 87.8 (2006) 100 
     Net school enrolment, secondary (percent) ... ... 37.1 (2006) 100 
     Youth illiteracy rate (% of people ages 15-24) 6.1 4.1 3.0 (2003) 0.0 
Goal 3 – Promote gender equality and empower women     
     Ratio of girls to boys in primary education (%) 96.5 97.1 99.0 (2007) 100 
     Ratio of girls to boys in secondary education (%) 78.9 83.9 93.0 (2007) 100 
     Ratio of girls to boys in tertiary education (%) 49.6 59.4 63.1 (2003) 100 
Goal 4 – Reduce child mortality     
     Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 76.0 99.0 105.0 (2007) 26.7 
     Immunization, measles (% of 1-2 year olds) 87.0 87.0 90.0 (2007) 100 
Goal 5 – Improve maternal health     
     Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births) 570.0 610.0 1,068 (2002) 142.5 
     Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total) 69.6 69.2 80.0 (2007) ... 
     Contraceptive prevalence (% of women ages 15-49) 43.1 48.1 60.0 (2007) ... 
Goal 6 – Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases     
     HIV prevalence ratio among adults (15-49) ... ... 15.3 (2007) ... 
Goal 7 – Ensure environmental sustainability     
     Access to improved sanitation facilities (% of population) 44.0 45.0 46.0 (2007) ... 
     Access to safe drinking water (% of population) 78.0 ... 81.0 (2007) 89.0 
Goal 8 – Develop a global partnership for development     
     Fixed line and mobile telephones 11.7 12.9 120.0 (2007) ... 
     Personal computers (per 1,000 people) 0.2 2.8 77.3 (2004) ... 
Sources: World Development Indicators; UN Statistics Division; UNAIDS; and IMF staff estimates 
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ANNEX 5. SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE 
Remittances Questionnaire 
You have to be from Zimbabwe to fill out this questionnaire.  All answers are completely confidential. 
Please answer the following questions as accurately as possible: 
Personal Information 
1. Gender:      M    F  
2. Age:     18-23     24-29     30-35     36-40     41-50    over 50  
 
3. Where are you from?  
a. What province?   Bulawayo    Harare   Manicaland   Mashonaland Central    
Mashonaland East    Mashonaland West   Masvingo   Matabeleland North  
Matabeleland South    Midlands 
b. What city?       
c. Is there a bank in your city?   Yes    No  
i. If no, how far away is the closest bank, by bus/car?   Less than 15 mins      
 15-30 minutes      30 minutes – 1 hour    more than 1 hour  
 
4. How long have you lived: 
a. In the Western Cape?   Less than 6 months     6 months –1 year     1-2 years         
 2-5 years       5-10 years         More than 10 years  
b. Did you live somewhere else in South Africa before that?     Yes    No      
i. If ‘yes’, for how long:      Less than 6 months      6 months –1 year                            
1-3 years        3-6 years     6-10 years      More than 10 years  
 
5. What is the main reason you came to South Africa?   To look for work     To escape political  
persecution      To study       To be with family      Other  
a. If ‘Other’, please specify:        
 
6. How often do you travel to Zimbabwe?      Every 3 months      Every 6 months       Once a 
year    Once every 2 years    Once every 3-4 years    Not in the last 4 years  
 
7. Would you move back to Zimbabwe permanently if things get better there?     Yes     No     
 
8. Do you have any children in Zimbabwe that need your money/goods?      Yes    No   
a. If yes, how many?    One     Two     Three     Four     Five or more  
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9. Do you have any children in South Africa that need your money/goods?   Yes    No  
a. If yes, how many children?    One    Two    Three    Four    Five or more  
 
10. Do you have any other close family members60 that rely on your income:  
a. In Zimbabwe?    Yes    No   
i. If yes, how many?    One    Two    Three    Four     Five or more  
b. In South Africa?   Yes    No   
i. If yes, how many?    One    Two    Three    Four     Five or more  
Education and Employment 
11. Do you have a high school diploma?    Yes    No  
a. If ‘Yes’, do you have a University Degree?     Yes    No  
b. If ‘No’, how many years of school did you finish?    
 
12. How many months, out of the last 12 months, did you work?     0-3 months      3-6 months         
6-10 months       more than 10 months  
 
13. On average, how much money do you earn per month? Less than R500    R500-R1000  R1000-
R2000     R2000 – R3000    R3000 – R4000    R4000 – R6000     R6000 +  
a. If more than R6000, please specify amount: R    
 
14. How do you get paid?        Cash       Cheque      Bank Transfer     Other  
a. If ‘other’, please specify:     
 
 
Remittances 
15. Do you send money and/or goods to your family in Zimbabwe?    Yes    No  
If you answered ‘no’, this is the end of the questionnaire for you.  Thank you for your help!  
16. Please estimate: what is the total amount of money (excluding goods) you sent to your family in 
Zimbabwe in the last 12 months?       Less than R500       R500-R1500       R1500-R3000   
R3000 – R5000    R5000 – R7500    R7500 - R10,000   +R10,000  
a. If you sent money worth more than R10,000, please specify amount:   R      . 
 
                                                          
60 ‘Close family members’ include only (in addition to the children): husband/wife, long-term boy- or girlfriend, 
parents, brothers/sisters, and grandparents. 
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17. If you send goods home to Zimbabwe, what kind of goods?  (check all that apply)    Food     
Clothes    Electronics    Medicine     Furniture     Kitchen Appliances    Other  
a. If ‘other’, please specify:          
 
18. Please estimate: what is the total value of goods61 (excluding cash) you sent to your family in 
Zimbabwe in the last 12 months?    Less than R500    R500-R1500   R1500-R3000   R3000 
– R5000       R5000 – R7500        R7500 - R10,000        More than R10,000  
a. If you sent goods worth more than R10,000, please specify amount:  R       k 
 
19. On average, how often do you send money/goods home to Zimbabwe?    Once a month     
Once every 3 months       Once every 6 months       Once a year        Other  
a. If ‘other’, please explain:         
 
20. How do you usually send money home to Zimbabwe?  (check all options that have used) 
a. Give it to friends or relatives that are travelling back to Zimbabwe  
b. Pay a transporter/bus driver  
c. I take it myself  
d. Postal Order  
e. Official Money Transfer business (Moneygram or Western Union)  
f. Other Money Transfer Business  
g. Bank transfer   
h. Other  
i. If ‘Other’, please specify:       
 
21. Why do you choose this option?  (please explain only the option that you use most often) 
a. Most of the time I choose option  (for example ‘d’ or ‘a’), because it is the:      Cheapest      
Most convenient/easiest      Most reliable/ safest      Fastest         Other            
If ‘Other’, please specify:      
 
22. On average, if you send R 1,000, how much does it cost you?     R0-R25      R25-R50            
R50 - R100      R100 - R150      R150 - R200     R200 - R300     More than R300  
   
23. Would you send more money home to Zimbabwe, if it became cheaper, easier and safer to send 
money?     Yes    No     Maybe  
24. If your family in Zimbabwe became poorer (or sick, etc.) and needed more money, could you send 
more money than you already send now?     Yes     No    Maybe  
 
                                                          
61 For example, if you sent home some clothes (worth R500), one fridge (worth R1500), and one stereo (worth 
R500) last year, you write R2500.   
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25. If you got a new job here where you would earn R10,000 more per year, would you send more 
money home to Zimbabwe?      Yes     No     Maybe  
a. If ‘yes’, estimate how much more you would send home per year? R500  R500-R1000      
R1000 – R2500       R2500 – R5000        R5000 – R7500      more than R7500  
 
26. Please estimate what share (portion or percentage) of the money you send, on average, your 
family in Zimbabwe use for:    
FOR EXAMPLE: 
a. School Fees               %              10% 
b. Food                  %              10% 
c. Clothing                   %                5% 
d. Rent                %              ----% 
e. Medicine + Doctor’s Fees      %              20% 
f. Special events (wedding/funeral)    %              ----% 
g. Durable goods (electronics, furniture, car, etc.)      %              15% 
h. Building Material      %               ----% 
i. Buying Livestock            %               ----% 
j. Business Investment      %              20% 
k. Savings                       %              20%  
l. Other                %               ----% 
(this has to add up to 100%.)              100% 
i. If ‘other’, please specify what:       
 
27. On average, without the money you send home to Zimbabwe, please estimate what is your 
family’s total income per month in Zimbabwe?   Less than R250     R250-R500  R500-R1000 
    R1000 – R2000     R2000 – R5000     more than R5000  
a. If ‘more than R5000, please specify amount: R  
 
28. Do you have any other comments on issues you have when you send money/goods home to 
Zimbabwe?  
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ANNEX 6. RESULTS OF THE PEARSON’S CORRELATION 
Although the correlation is not that strong, the relationship does seem to be positive and linear, 
which justifies using the Pearson’s correlation as a statistical test for this data set.   
GRAPH 6: REMITTANCES AND DEPENDANTS IN ZIMBABWE 
 
The following table displays the results of the Pearson’s correlation calculation: 
 
TABLE 6: PEARSON’S CORRELATION RESULTS 
  Share of income remitted 
Children 
in S.A. 
Dependants in 
Zimbabwe 
Length of 
stay in SA 
Share of income remitted 1 
   Children in S.A. -0.124704621 1 
  Dependants in Zimbabwe 0.455929794 0.071025 1 
 Length of stay in SA -0.143962674 0.430982 0.037045121 1 
 
 
ANNEX 7. HAWALA SYSTEM IN SOUTH ASIA 
A number of complex and well established informal remittance systems have arisen in 
communities with a long history of emigration. These include the fei ch’ien and chit systems in 
China and the Thai poey kuan system.  The largest and best known informal remittance system, 
however, is hawala, which originated in India and Pakistan. The system carries approximately $10 
billion to $20 billion a year in India and more than $5 billion a year in Pakistan. 
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The mechanics of the system are as follows: a hawaladar (i.e.: broker) accepts funds from a 
remitter in country A who wishes to send money to country B.  The details of the remittance 
(recipient, size, and a proposed collection code) are then sent by the hawaladar to their 
counterpart in country B, by phone, fax or email.  Once the collection code is agreed on, the 
sending hawaladar gives it to the remitter, who must then privately relay it to the remittance 
recipient.  The receiving hawaladar then pays the recipient, on presentation of the collection code.  
The transaction is typically not receipted, and can therefore be characterised as trust-based.  
Debts that arise between hawaladars can be cleared in a number of ways.  Often there is a pre-
existing business relationship, and debts can be cleared by under- or over-invoicing on 
transactions.  Sometimes the receiving hawaladar is in debt to the sending hawaladar, and the 
hawala relationship is thus a means of clearing that debt.  For the consumer, motivations for 
using hawala rather than a formal remittance system include its cost effectiveness (hawalas are 
cheaper than formal remitters, charging commissions of only 0.25-1.25%); its speed and 
reliability (hawalas are often faster than formal remittance channels); and its lack of bureaucracy 
and identification requirements (Buencamino and Soronov 2002). 
 
ANNEX 8. MOBILE-PHONE BANKING IN THE PHILIPPINES 
 
Source: World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2006: 150. 
 
ANNEX 9. SURVEY RESULTS ON REMITTANCE UTILIZATION 
The great majority of remittances globally are used for primary consumption.  According to the 
IFAD, 90 per cent of remittances to poor countries are spent on food, clothes, housing, 
education and health (IFAD 2008).  The findings of this survey display a similar story, as the 
Graph 7 below summarizes.  Survey participants were asked to estimate what remittance 
recipients spend the money on, as a share of the total remittances they receive.  The result clearly 
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shows a bias towards consumer goods (shown in red), with 69 per cent on average being spent 
on food (22 per cent), school fees (14 per cent), clothing (12 per cent), rent (9 per cent), medical 
bills (8 per cent) and special events such as funerals and weddings (4 per cent).  Of the total, only 
6 per cent was spent on durable goods, while 7 per cent was used for purchasing building 
material.  Only 8 per cent was used for investment, primarily for buying livestock and seeds. 
 
 
GRAPH 7: UTILIZATION OF REMITTANCES 
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